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This thesis examines a largely unexplored area of deterrence theory – 
unconventional deterrence. Unconventional deterrence is defined herein as “persuading 
the opponent not to attack, via threats of unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla 
resistance and terrorism.” It treats terrorism as a punishment strategy, through which the 
one deterring threatens to punish the aggressor’s population. Guerrilla warfare is a denial 
strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to protract a war and deny the 
aggressor his political objectives. This study questions the underlying hypothesis of 
deterrence theory which says that the balance of the opponents’ military capabilities is 
the basic determinant of successful deterrence. Rather, the hypothesis here is that the 
deterrer may deter the aggressor from attacking by adopting a strategy that makes the 
aggressor’s military superiority irrelevant. The present thesis focuses primarily on 
relatively weak states. Unconventional deterrence is explored as a means for a weaker 
state to deter a considerably stronger opponent. 
This thesis discusses the requirements for successful deterrence, and the 
peculiarities of unconventional deterrence. As well, the dynamics of small wars are 
explored in order to unfold a paradoxical phenomenon: the possibility of an underdog’s 
victory in war. Two case studies: (1) the Vietnam War of 1964-73 and (2) the 
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Held captive by the accepted strategic framework, time and time again the 
losers explained away their defeat by citing mitigating factors. 
Martin van Creveld, Transformation of War 
A. BACKGROUND 
Unconventional warfare is not a new phenomenon in history. As in the biblical 
conflict between David and Goliath, guerrilla warfare has showed its potential throughout 
history; from Fabians and Spaniard guerrillas’ fighting successfully against Hannibal, and 
later, Napoleon, throughout the colonial wars of the 20th century, to the driving out of 
both Cold War superpowers, as in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The current conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well, exemplify the difficulties that can be created for an 
overwhelmingly dominant antagonist in fighting against resistance of this kind. Likewise, 
the Russians have encountered similar difficulties in Chechnya. 
It is generally agreed by military strategist and theoreticians that guerrilla warfare 
is a weapon of the weak. Ever since Mao, who first explicitly transformed guerrilla 
warfare from being merely a tactical approach, to being a full-blown strategy, guerrilla 
warfare has been considered as an underdog’s weapon of necessity, rather than choice - 
“defeat is invariable outcome where native forces fight with inferior weapons against 
modernized forces on the latter’s terms” (as cited in Mack, 1983, p. 176). In other words, 
Mao suggests that, to avoid being crushed, the weak must refuse to wage a war that plays 
to the strengths of the superior enemy. 
This rule has been proven repeatedly during the 20th century. Compare, for 
example, the outcomes of the Gulf War of 1991, in which the underdog chose to wage a 
conventional war of attrition and maneuver, playing to the opponent’s strengths, with the 
Vietnam War, where the underdog refused to fight on the terms of a superior enemy, 
adopting a low-intensity guerrilla warfare method, instead. However, guerrilla warfare 
has remained more accepted by sub-state groups (mostly for insurrectionary purposes) 
than it has by weak states. In contrast to sub-states actors, small states have not treated 
guerrilla warfare as a way to balance their inherent military weaknesses, vis-à-vis 
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stronger opponents, especially in defensive wars. Guerrilla warfare has been either an 
ancillary function, if any, of main conventional forces, or has been believed to arise, 
spontaneously, out of the common populous, as a response to the enemy’s occupation. 
For instance, Hans von Dach’s Total Resistance (which, in fact, is a guerrilla handbook 
for the Swiss society and military) clearly appreciates the potential of guerrilla resistance. 
However, Dach advises what to do, only after conventional troops have been overrun. In 
other words, Dach suggests that guerrilla warfare is not supposed to replace conventional 
resistance.  
The current war in Iraq, as well, seems to fit into the pattern above discussed. 
Although the Iraqi forces were crushingly defeated on the battlefields, as of late, coalition 
forces have been facing a seemingly insurmountable insurgency. On the other hand, 
speculations have been made that Saddam Hussein may have learned the lessons from the 
first Gulf War and, subsequently, concentrated his war efforts on strategies for engaging 
the opposition in guerrilla warfare.1 Although there is not enough evidence to confirm 
this, using John Keegan’s (2004) words, the “mysteriousness” of the war, such as, 
melting the most loyal and best equipped troops in the battlefields; having no fierce 
resistance in Baghdad, etc., suggests that this might be a reasonable assumption. Huge 
caches of weapons being found by coalition forces, along with ammunition, and US 
dollars, also suggests that the ongoing insurgency may not be an ad hoc popular uprising. 
However, even though Saddam Hussein may have carefully preplanned and prepared for 
the guerrilla war, he, definitely, did not try to deter his opponents by using this kind of 
warfare. Would such an attempt have been reasonable? Because of the US 
Administration apparently made every effort to reassure their own public that the war 
would not be a Vietnam-type “quagmire” (i.e., that the war in Iraq would be short and 
decisive), such deterrence, via unconventional war tactics, would have been logical. 
Overall, deterrence is the first line of defense (Joseph, 2001, p. 53). 
 
 
1 For example, Herbert E. Meyer (2004) thinks, “the CIA failed to project Saddam Hussein's war 
strategy - to melt into the population and then launch guerrilla attacks rather than fight our army head-on in 
the field.”  
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It is interesting to note that not all of these ideas, namely both fighting 
unconventionally and deterring by it, are new. Indeed, the idea of asymmetric warfare 
usually includes guerrilla resistance and terrorism, and has been circulating among 
strategists, who have tried to predict the future challenges for the US, since the end of the 
first Gulf War (Mahnken 1993; Allan, 1994; Pfaltzgraff and Wright, 2000). However, 
guerrilla warfare, as a strategy, (as well as a way for the weak to deter the strong) remains 
an area that is entirely ignored by deterrence theoreticians. Thus, the underlying 
hypothesis of deterrence theory remains based on military balance, i.e., that “shifts in the 
military balance in favor of the defender will make challenges less likely, whereas shifts 
in the military balance in favor of the challenger will make challenge more likely” 
(Russet, 1994, p. 41). Although this hypothesis has been challenged in theoretical debates 
many times (however, mainly based on misperception problems), and the argumentation 
that balance of interests, or motivations, is important has been established by several 
authors (e.g., Morgan, 2003, p. 164; Freedman, 2004, p. 47), the concept of military 
balance remains as the core of deterrence theory. 
John J. Mearsheimer (1983) and Paul K. Huth (1988) have made the argument 
that aggressors do not like long wars. Such authors appear to challenge the concept of the 
overriding importance of military balance in their works. However, both come back to 
drawing similar conclusions, namely that military balance is an important determinant of 
a given deterrence’s success of failure. Mearsheimer (1983) starts his analysis by arguing 
that the most important determinant is military strategies of antagonists. If an opponent is 
precluded from pursuing an option to achieve a quick and decisive victory, it is most 
likely that deterrence will succeed, because aggressors usually do not like long wars of 
attrition – the reasoning is that such wars are too costly, and unpredictable. However, 
Mearsheimer explicitly leaves guerrilla warfare as a strategy beyond his considerations, 
and his overall conclusion is that military balance is, indeed, important. In other words, 
for as long as forces that are available for each side shows a great disparity, the strategy 
of the weaker of the two sides is irrelevant. Deterrence will not work if the aggressor is 
able literally to overwhelm the defender. Huth (1988; 1999) found that local military 
balance is more relevant to the success of a deterrence than is overall strategic balance. 
That is to say, the defender’s military capabilities in repulsing an attack from the very 
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beginning play an important role in determining deterrence outcomes, because attackers 
generally do not like prolonged wars of attrition. Similar to earlier studies, Huth also does 
not look beyond the common argumentation, i.e., that large military capability is the only 
way to threaten the aggressor with prolonged war. 
Therefore, this study seeks answers to the following questions: “What if the 
defender promises a protracted war by guerrilla resistance, instead of repulsing the large-
scale attack?”; “What if the defender threatens to deny the aggressor of his political 
objectives, instead of defeating the aggressor’s forces on the battlefield?”; “What if the 
defender threatens to engage the aggressor in an endless, un-winnable fight?”; “What if 
the defender boosts his denial element with the threats of terrorist strikes on the 
challenger’s regime, population, and/or economic structures?”; “What if the defender’s 
strategy is to make the aggressors military superiority irrelevant?” In other words, “Can 
the stronger opponent be deterred by such unconventional threats as guerrilla warfare and 
terrorism?” 
B. SCOPE 
1. Research Questions 
The purpose of this study is to examine and discuss unconventional deterrence, 
and thereby, to broaden the deterrence debate, while helping to fill gaps in deterrence 
theory. The main research question is whether a strategy of unconventional deterrence 
employed by relatively weak states can deter greater powers from their aggression. 
Supporting research questions are as follows: 
- How should unconventional deterrence be defined? 
- What are the conditions for successful deterrence? 
- Are there dynamics and/or determinant factors that are unique to small wars? 
- Can a small state create the conditions for successful deterrence using 
unconventional warfare to deter larger states? 
2. General Framework 
This study does not intend to reformulate deterrence theory, or solve the internal 
deterrence debates. In fact, deterrence theory is too complex to be covered in detail in a 
study such as this. Thus, this study accepts current deterrence theory, with all of its major 
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weaknesses, inherent theoretical inconsistencies, and practical unreliability.2 As Patrick 
M. Morgan (2003) concludes, “deterrence came to be a central component of our security 
so it continues to be very important to understand it and practice it as best as we can. But 
understanding it means facing up to the fact that it is inherently imperfect. It does not 
consistently work, and we cannot manipulate it sufficiently to fix that and make it a 
completely reliable tool of statecraft” (p. 285). 
In addition, two other ideas need to be mentioned that are currently circulating in 
academic papers. Although a full discussion of these ideas is beyond the scope of this 
study, both are significant to the broad framework presented here: 
- The nature of modern war is changing. Low-intensity conflicts, or “fourth 
generation warfare”, have become a common area of analysis by today’s 
strategic thinkers. In a seminal work on this topic, The Transformation of 
War, Martin van Creveld (1991) predicts the spread of low-intensity 
conflict, and demise of conventional war. Although not many scholars and 
strategists are as provocative as van Creveld who remarked, “war will not 
be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, 
guerrillas, bandits and robbers” (1991, p. 197), undoubtedly, there exists a 
broad consensus that asymmetric warfare will likely dominate the scene of 
future conflicts.3  
- The process of globalization has tended to be advantageous for the weaker 
actors. According to Audrey Kurth Cronin (2002), the use of information 
technologies, easier movement across international boundaries, and less 
restricted flows of financial resources, strengthen terrorists groups, while 
making developed countries more vulnerable (pp. 38-41). In addition, the 
development of, and ease of access to, technologies have enabled small 
organizations to gain more and more destructive and disruptive power. 
Although the majority of scholars worry about terrorist organizations, it 
seems reasonable to argue that the processes of globalization and 








2 See Morgan (2003) for a comprehensive review of deterrence theory: Chapter 2 restates major 
theoretical weaknesses; Chapter 4 describes the difficulties of deterrence studies, elusiveness of the 
variables that control deterrence success or failure, and limitations of deterrence in practice. See also Colin 
S. Gray’s (2003) shortlist, summarizing why deterrence today is “in a condition of crisis” (pp. 17-25).       
3 See for example Mahnken (1993), Pfaltzgraff and Wright (2000), Wilson et al (2001), and Hammes 
(2004).   
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3. Limitations 
a. Deterrence and Compellence 
This study limits itself to the examination of unconventional threats as a 
deterrent, rather than as a compellent. Although both deterrence and compellence are 
coercive strategies (Freedman, 2004, p. 27), and complementary activities (Pape, 1996, p. 
7), they are conceptually different: while deterrence persuades an opponent that he must 
not act, compellence requires acting in a certain way. There is a general agreement in the 
literature that compellence is harder to achieve than deterrence, because, most argue, it is 
more difficult to get somebody to do, re-do, or stop doing something, than it is to 
motivate someone not to do that same something (Pape, 1996, p. 6; Morgan, 2003, p. 2; 
Freedman, 2004, p. 110). Because compellence forces an opponent to act in a certain 
way, it usually brings greater humiliation to him (Art, 1980, p. 7). By contrast, deterrence 
is primarily a status quo strategy, i.e., the opponent’s compliance is manifested by his 
choosing not to act. The reason why this limitation is important to understand for the 
present discussion is that, deterrent threats are inherently more credible than compellent 
threats. In Pape’s words, “threats that deter may not coerce” (Pape, 1996, p. 6). 
b. Weak, Non-Aligned, Status Quo States 
Although unconventional deterrence is not necessarily limited to weak 
states, and strong states, as well, can use unconventional threats in their overall security 
strategies, this study concentrates on weak states. However, both in theory and in 
practice, it is impossible to draw clear boundaries between weak and strong states (or 
small states versus great powers). Therefore, definitions of weak states tend to be very 
imprecise. Among the majority of theoreticians, the consensus appears to exist only on 
one point with regard to weak states: the characteristic, central to the definition of weak 
states, is that they cannot defend themselves by their own efforts against any of the great 
powers (Handel, 1981, p. 76). In other words, military weakness and inability to secure 
its own existence are central in defining what constitutes weak states. For the purpose of 
this study, we accept the notion that “weakness” is a relative term, rather than being 
absolute. Any state can find itself in a position of either being an underdog, or being a 
“great power,”  vis-à-vis  their particular  opponent  (e.g.,  Iraq  versus  the  US,  and  Iraq  
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versus Kuwait, respectively). Thus, the weak state is “one that has a narrow ’power base,’ 
compared to the other state(s) with which it interacts, especially those with which it has 
conflicts” (Platias, 1994, p. 45).  
Being more precise, and going to the essence of the matter, this thesis 
concentrates on weak states. Weak states, in the words of John J. Mearsheimer (1983), 
find themselves in unenviable situations, where “the asymmetry is so great that the 
attacker does not have the slightest doubt that he will succeed on the battlefield” (p. 59). 
In turn, according to the author, when this lack of balance of forces is overwhelming, “the 
concept of [conventional] deterrence does not really apply” (Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 59). 
Of course, it would be naïve to argue that Mearsheimer is completely wrong, and that 
there is an easy way out of this predicament. The difficulty of this predicament is nicely 
illustrated in a popular Finnish war novel when it says, “One Finn may be worth ten 
Russians but what do we do when the eleventh comes along?” (as cited in Handel, 1981, 
p. 76). However, this should not preclude one from looking for remedies for this intrinsic 
weakness. On the contrary, keeping mind limited resources available to weak states, and 
overwhelming misbalances of power, this study looks for an optimal strategy of a weak 
state, to inflict the largest amount of pain and cost (and, in turn, to deter by it). 
In addition, pure unconventional deterrence does not seem to be the best 
option for aligned states, or for those that are involved in extended deterrence. Generally 
speaking, a weak state that concentrates its defense according to the expectations of an 
external military assistance, normally needs to defend some important strategic points of 
their national territory, in order to facilitate the intervention of its allies. In turn, that is 
inherently inconsistent with unconventional capabilities, which are not the best means for 
holding territory. Therefore, this study is limited to neutral, or non-aligned, weak states 
which, for whatever reason, concentrate their efforts primarily on the mobilization of 
internal resources to guarantee their defense. 
Another distinction must be made between status quo and revisionist 
states. Since “weakness” is a relative concept, any state can find itself in a position of 
either being an underdog, or being a “great power,” vis-à-vis its opponent, and of being 
either a defender, or a challenger of the status quo. The reason why this distinction is 
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important for our discussion is that, for a relatively weak state that not only seeks to deter 
the strong from aggression, but also aims to challenge the existing status quo, pure 
unconventional deterrence would not be the best strategy. Although the nature of war is 
changing, a revisionist state needs to maintain larger or smaller conventional forces for 
expansionist purposes (e.g., to occupy opponent’s territories, control it, implement 
occupational duties, etc.), because entirely unconventional forces appear to be not enough 
for these tasks in most cases. Therefore, pure unconventional deterrence seems to be 
limited to weak states that are satisfied with the status quo. That is not to say, however, 
that revisionist states cannot use unconventional capabilities as a part of their overall 
strategies. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodological approach used here is primarily theoretical. This study 
combines insights from deterrence, and “small war” theories, to outline a framework for 
unconventional deterrence strategies. Because unconventional deterrence has not been 
used as an elaborate strategy, there is no basis for a pure inductive approach. That is, 
there is no sample of case studies to analyze, construct a theory, and proceed to testing 
it.4 On the other hand, the broad spectrum of existing literature on deterrence theory and 
practice lets one identify commonly agreed upon requirements for successful deterrence, 
examining them deductively to see how these conditions can be satisfied by a weak state, 
i.e. one trying to deter a great power through the use of unconventional threats. 
In addition, insights drawn from small war theories are used to discuss the 
dynamics of small wars. Students of small wars deal with a paradoxical phenomenon, 
namely why some conflicts do not conform to the “iron rule of power,” and an underdog 
is able to defeat the strong in war. Therefore, their insights are functionally significant for 
examining unconventional deterrence. As we will see below in the discussion, many 
determinants of small wars also reflect the requirements for successful deterrence.5
 
4 This problem reflects the development of nuclear deterrence theory and strategies during the Cold 
War. Although nuclear weapons were used in war, “there was no basis for an inductive theory” (Freedman, 
2004, p. 22). In other words, there were no cases of failures or successes of nuclear deterrence to be 
analyzed.  
5 Warfigthing, as well as defense, and deterrence are not the same. However, they overlap.  One can 
better deter by making an opponent to believe that he has capabilities not only to inflict an unbearable cost, 
but also to win a war. All things being equal, the higher the probability, perceived by a challenger, that he 
could loose a war, the more credible deterrence will be.   
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The problematic part of this study, as mentioned above, is that there are no cases 
where a weak state utilizes unconventional deterrence. Therefore, the only option to 
support or deny propositions made in this study, is to analyze the actual cases where 
guerrilla warfare was been used to fight against the strong. In other words, the “model” is 
tested indirectly. The assumption is that if the weak can deny the objectives of the strong, 
via a particular type of warfare, it is reasonable to suggest that the threat of this kind of 
resistance can be used as a deterrent. In addition, in the majority of cases where the weak 
denies the strong his objectives by unconventional warfare, the weak actor is a sub-group 
within a state, rather than being a state, itself. However, this thesis contends that there are 
no reasons to suggest that the weak state cannot exploit the advantages of this kind of 
warfare, as well. 
Two cases are analyzed in this study – the Vietnam War of 1964-73, and the 
Afghanistan War of 1979-89. However, because these cases have been widely analyzed, 
there are no extensive historical reviews of either conflict in the text. Both wars were 
chosen from an extensive list of guerrilla wars for the following reasons: 1) both are 
classic examples of the stronger side losing a war against the weaker side who used 
guerrilla tactics; 2) the asymmetry of power in both cases was very high – in both cases, 
the strong was a recognized superpower; 3) the regimes of the stronger in the two 
conflicts were of a different type, one being authoritarian (i.e., the USSR) and the other 
democratic (i.e., the US). Hence, this thesis has avoided limiting itself to the notion that 



























II. UNCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 
A. DEFINITION OF UNCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 
The essence of deterrence is preventing the other party from doing something 
unacceptable, through threats of harming him if he does (Morgan, 2003, p. 1). According 
to Lawrence Freedman (2004), deterrence is a deliberate manipulation of the behavior of 
others, through conditional threats (p. 6). In strategic studies, however, deterrence is 
defined more narrowly and precisely. Paul K. Huth (1988), for example, defines 
deterrence “as a policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of military 
retaliation, that the cost of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh 
the benefits” (p. 15). Thus, military threats, as a means of persuading an enemy not to 
attack, are central to deterrence. Threats, either through denial of the opponent’s 
objectives on the battlefield (i.e., “counter-force strategies”), or via punishment strikes 
that have no military purposes, at all (i.e., “counter-value strategies”), are designed to 
change an opponent’s calculations about any prospective gains, if he considers attacking. 
Two widely analyzed types of deterrence – conventional and nuclear – are based on 
different kind of capabilities, and on different modes of inflicting cost through the use of 
these capabilities. While conventional deterrence is mostly associated with conventional 
forces denying an opponent’s objectives on the battlefield, nuclear deterrence is primarily 
based upon punitive, or retaliatory, strikes, through the threat of using nuclear weapons 
on, primarily, non-military or quasi-military targets. However, neither conventional nor 
nuclear deterrence is strictly limited to counter-force and counter-value strategies, 
respectively. Conventional deterrence is sometimes associated with punishment (e.g., 
strategic bombing campaigns with conventional weapons), and nuclear weapons can be 
used on tactical levels to deny an opponent’s objectives on the battlefield. Furthermore, 
war-fighting schools argue that the credibility of nuclear deterrence depends on the 
threatening party’s ability to fight, and win at any level, even in an all-out nuclear war 
(Morgan, 2003, p. 24). 
Following the logic of distinguishing between conventional and nuclear 
deterrence, unconventional deterrence can be defined as persuasion of the opponent not 
to attack via threats of unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla war and terrorism, 
including their various subcategories (e.g., assassinations of politico-military leadership, 
cyber-terrorism, terrorism by WMD, etc.).6 While guerrilla warfare is mostly connected 
with counter-force strategies, terrorism is based on punishment. Figure 1 illustrates the 
typology of deterrence, with a new type added, beside two basic types of deterrence – 
















Figure 1.   Typology of Deterrence  
 
However, these types of deterrence do not have to be treated as very rigid, and in 
some cases, the boundaries between them is blurred. For example, the threat of using 
tactical nuclear weapons is very close to conventional deterrence, because tactical nuclear 
weapons are designed primarily to deny opponent’s objectives on the battlefield. The 
Finns’ small unit tactics, which were adopted to fight against Russia during the Winter 
War, would be considered somewhere between unconventional and conventional 
deterrence. One could even argue that there is nothing unconventional in regular forces 
using small unit attacks. A hypothetical scenario might be presented by a weak state that 
hides a nuclear device in the opponents’ city, and threatens to activate this device in the 
case of aggression. This would verge on being considered nuclear deterrence. 
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6 Sometimes the term ‘unconventional’ is used to indicate non-conventional forces or nuclear weapons 
and WMD. However, it is more common in military science to refer by ‘unconventional’ to guerrilla 
warfare, terrorism, and other shadowy ways of warfare. Therefore, the usage of ‘unconventional’ seems to 
be appropriate in this study.  
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The other question, associated with unconventional deterrence, is the place of 
deterrence through the use of, or threat thereof, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 
this typology. Although deterrence by WMD can be treated as a separate type, due to its 
specificity, it seems more reasonable to deconstruct this term, and to look at in what 
mode each of WMD can be used. For example, as long as weak states develop nuclear 
capabilities (i.e., what is referred to today as proliferation of WMD), and arm their 
ballistic missiles with nuclear war-heads, that does not seem to be conceptually different 
from the nuclear deterrence used by both superpowers in the Cold War. In contrast, if a 
radiological or nuclear bomb, for example, were secretly delivered to an opponent’s 
country, this mode of utilizing nuclear capability would, clearly, fit into the realm of 
unconventional deterrence. The same logic can be applied to chemical weapons, which 
can be used on the conventional battlefield, in terrorist acts, or utilized to arm ballistic 
missiles for retaliatory strikes on population centers. In brief, as long as WMD are used 
for threatening a terrorist attack, these threats shall be considered unconventional 
deterrence. Other ways of utilizing them do not seem to be different from orthodox 
deterrence categories – nuclear and conventional – that aim at either denial of opponent’s 
battlefield objective, or punishment of his population on a large scale. 
B. UNCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE STRATEGIES  
As mentioned previously, deterrence theory groups deterrence strategies into two 
general categories – punishment and denial.7 Unconventional deterrence strategies, as 
well, fit into this general framework, and threats have to be designed either to punish the 
challenger (primarily through terrorist acts), or to deny him his objectives (mainly via 
guerrilla resistance). However, in this study, denial is defined more broadly than in the 
works on conventional deterrence. Mearsheimer (1983), for example, considers denial 
only as a function of denying an aggressor his battlefield objectives (p. 15). Pape (1996) 
appears to criticize deterrence theorists, because, he says, they usually refer to denial only 
to defeat of an anticipated attack. According to Pape, denial operates via military means 
to prevent the targeted party from achieving its political objectives (p. 13). Thus, in 
unconventional deterrence, the function  of  denial is to threaten the challenger in order to 
 
7 Distinction between denial and punishment was first elaborated by Glenn Snyder (1961).  
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deny to him his political, rather than his battlefield, objectives. In contrast to conventional 
deterrence, battlefields are to be deliberately avoided, and holding territory is not an 
objective in unconventional deterrence. 
However, one has to acknowledge that, in unconventional deterrence, the 
boundaries between denial and punishment strategies are far blurrier than in conventional 
and nuclear deterrence. Freedman (2004) argues that denial has punitive elements, as 
well, but, essentially, tends toward controlling a situation in order to deny the opponent 
strategic options (p. 37). Therefore, if we consider deterrence strategies as ranging on a 
punishment-denial spectrum, the more opponents are allowed to maneuver freely, the 
more strategy moves towards the punishment pole of the spectrum. In unconventional 
deterrence, because guerrilla warfare is not one of the best means for holding territory, 
the deterrer deliberately concedes territory to the aggressor. Therefore, the aggressor, 
inevitably, have more freedom to maneuver, especially in the military realm. Also, 
though the targets of guerrilla attacks are primarily military (i.e., counter-force 
strategies), they do not have a clear-cut military value, per se, as in conventional denial. 
Guerrilla attacks are intended, primarily, to diminish the opponent’s will, instead of 
trying to defeat him military. In sum, in unconventional deterrence, denial strategies 
appear to involve more punitive elements than denial in conventional deterrence, because 
the former operate to deny the opponent of his long-term political objective, and are not 
aimed at gaining a short-term military victory. In order to achieve the former objective, 
the weak state has to concede the latter (i.e., military victory) to the aggressor. 
Hence, based on the distinction between denial and punishment, one can identify 
two main strategies of unconventional deterrence – guerrilla warfare and terrorism. While 
the former is about threatening to deny an opponent his political objectives, the latter 
concentrates on punishing his population. 
Guerrilla warfare, although usually associated with revolutionary and subversive 
wars, insurgencies, insurrections, etc., is treated primarily as combat tactics in this study. 
As Klonis suggests, what defines guerrillas is how they fight, but not why, where, or 
when (as cited in Hoffman, 2000, p. 12). Likewise, Samuel Huntington agrees when he 
says that, “guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side 
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assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places” (as cited in Laqueur, 
1998, p. 392). In other words, guerrilla warfare is all about harassing the enemy and 
exhausting him, via hit-and-run attacks in a frontless war, instead of trying to annihilate 
him in decisive battles.8 Guerrillas seek to protract conflicts, thus making them too costly 
and uncomfortable for the enemy, instead of trying to win it quickly, via attrition of the 
enemy’s forces. Urban and rural guerrilla warfare are usually distinguished as being two 
different alternatives. However, many analysts observe that urban guerrilla warfare tends 
to move rather quickly into terrorism.9 Decapitation, or targeting political and/or military 
leadership, usually is a part of guerrilla warfare, implemented on a tactical level. 
However, it can also be used also as a separate strategy of unconventional deterrence. In 
other words, assassinations of key leadership, especially high-level decision-makers, can 
be utilized as a basic deterrent threat, employed on a strategic level.10
Likewise, terrorism is a broad socio-political phenomenon. In this work, however, 
terrorism is considered as being tactics of attacking non-combatants for political 
purposes.11 More precisely, terrorism, as an unconventional deterrence strategy, is the 
threat of pure punitive retaliation – i.e., attacking civilians with no military purpose, at 
all. As a deterrence strategy, therefore, it tends to be similar to nuclear deterrence (or, in 
the words of Morgan (2003, p. 15), “hostage-taking on the large scale”), but on a smaller 
scale. In terms of what is being targeted, discriminate and indiscriminate terrorism can be 
distinguished as separate strategies. In the sense that terrorism is, in general, not as 
violent as nuclear weapons, or conventional strategic bombing (maybe with the exception 
of precision guided munitions), a feasible strategic choice is to employ violent methods 
more indiscriminately (e.g., threatening to target particular individuals, such as relatives 
of high-level decision-makers, etc.). At the other end of the spectrum, where the 
destruction is, at least theoretically, highest, is terrorism by WMD. From the perspective 
of the theoreticians of nuclear deterrence, who see the credibility of nuclear deterrence as 
a function of high destructiveness, terrorism by WMD would be the only feasible strategy 
 
8 See Delbruck (1985, pp. 293-295) on distinction between annihilation and exhaustion strategies. 
9 See on guerrilla warfare, for example, Asprey (1994), Laqueur (1998), and Beckett (2001).  
10 Decapitation as a separate strategy, although implemented by air power, is elaborated by Pape 
(1996, pp. 79-86).  
11 See on the definition of terrorism, for example, Laqueur (2004, pp. 232-238). 
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of unconventional deterrence. In contrast, cyber-terrorism, or terrorism in cyberspace 
and/or from cyberspace, is ideally based, not on destruction, rather on disruption.12 The 
infliction of economic damage is a primary objective, although not the only one. As Dan 
Verton (2004) argues, an attack from cyberspace, coupled with a physical attack, could 
have the largest consequences, in terms of devastation.  
Although this thesis distinguishes between terrorism and guerrilla warfare, as two, 
conceptually different strategic choices, in practice, such strategies can be more 
intertwined than ideal models suggest. Terrorizing civilians is common in guerrilla 
warfare, but usually only on a tactical level. Likewise, the process of political discourse 
can, subjectively, obscure the distinction between two strategies. For example, two 
events, commonly identified as terrorist acts – the 1983 bombing of the US Marine 
barracks in Beirut, and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden – have, in fact, more 
attributes of guerrilla warfare, than of terrorism. However, this confusion poses 
conceptually different problems that go beyond the scope of deterrence theory. 
Deterrence theory neglects the problems that are posed by the implementation of threats, 
as long as the opponent believes that such threats are credible and will be implemented.13
The more important question that needs to be considered, is whether denial or 
punishment (or, in our case, guerrilla warfare or terrorism) would be more effective as an 
unconventional deterrence strategy. Unfortunately, deterrence theory does not provide an 
unambiguous answer. For example, Barry Buzan (1994) argues that nuclear retaliation is 
the only feasible strategy of deterrence, because of the exceptional level of 
destructiveness. Buzan says, “deterrence logic does not work very well with conventional 
weapons, because there is always the possibility that your opponent will take the risk” (p. 
26). According to this logic, only terrorism by WMD can be considered a feasible 
deterrent, as long as the opponent believes that the party threatening is able and willing to 
 
12 On cyber-terrorism and vulnerabilities of developed nations, see for example Verton (2004).  
13 For example, nuclear deterrence does not consider the morality, and legitimacy of targeting civilians 
per se. The question of targeting civilians is only considered in the context of deterrence credibility. In 
other words, the core of the problem is not that it is unethical to target civilians but that opponent may not 
believe that the deterrer is ready to inflict a very large amount of destructiveness on the deterree’s 
population for some unessential (from the deterree’s perspective) reason.  
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inflict large-scale destruction.14 On the other hand, Freedman (2004) makes an argument 
that, “in principle, denial is a more reliable strategy than punishment, because if the 
threats have to be implemented, it offers control rather than continuing coercion. With 
punishment, the target is left to decide how much more to take. With denial the choice is 
removed” (p. 39). Huntington adds that denial alone is not enough, and that a punitive 
element needs to boost the threat (as cited in Freedman, 2004, p. 38). Likewise, Kenneth 
Watman and Dean Wilkening (1996) suggest that, for opponents who are motivated to 
avert perceived lose (i.e., harder to deter), deterrence requires threats to deny their 
objectives, with additional threats to punish the regime (p. 85). Overall, Freedman (2004) 
concludes, “comparative advantage of one over the other will in the end depend on the 
options available” (p. 39).15
With regard to unconventional deterrence, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
logic would be different: the adoption of any strategy depends on the strategic 
environment, available options, and the opponent’s vulnerabilities. What is reasonable to 
argue is that if an aggressor’s attack has only limited aims, unconventional deterrence by 
denial most likely would not obtain. For example, if the aggressor needs to occupy a 
small piece of the deterrer’s territory for limited military aims (e.g., to install a missile 
launching pad), and does not have any long-term political objectives in said country, the 
threat of guerrilla warfare probably would not work. Since the opponent does not have 
any long-term political objectives, it makes no sense to threaten him with the denial of his 
political objectives. In this case, a punishment strategy would be a priority over denial. 
In addition, it is logical to suggest that due to limited destructiveness of 
unconventional threats (with the possible exception of WMD), the declared response to 
aggression has to be tailored much more carefully to the fears of specific opponent, his 
society, and leadership involved. 
 
14 In the strategic and political discourse, the use of the concept of WMD (which usually includes 
nuclear, biological, radiological, and chemical weapons) is problematic and imprecise per se, because 
sometimes a terrorist act by conventional bomb can be more destructive than by, for example, chemical 
weapon. Most likely, only nuclear and biological terrorism can inflict relatively large-scale destructiveness.  
15 Pape (1996) also concludes that denial strategies operate better than punitive (with the exception of 
nuclear punishment). However, his analysis is limited to coercion strategies, not deterrence. Since both are 
conceptually different, we cannot make inferences from Pape’s findings.  
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C. LOW DESTRUCTIVENESS, COST SENSITIVITY, AND LIMITED 
RATIONALITY 
The relatively limited destructiveness of unconventional threats appears to be one 
of the most problematic parts of unconventional deterrence. As Morgan (2003) suggests, 
motivating opponents via threats of precise loss is far more complex than through threats 
of doing vast damage (p. 223). Even conventional deterrence has been criticized as being 
inherently unreliable, because of its relatively low destructive power, when compared 
with nuclear weapons. In other words, in conventional deterrence, there is always a 
possibility that the aggressor will take the risk (Buzan, 1994, p. 26). Watman and 
Wilkening (1995) also agree that conventional forces will never be as deterring as nuclear 
weapons. “Nuclear forces simply are inherently more impressive and clear in their 
destructiveness” (Watman and Wilkening, 1995, p. 29). Obviously, this problem of low 
destructiveness is exacerbated in unconventional deterrence. It is reasonable to suggest 
that bands of guerrillas will not be as impressive as lined-up divisions near the border, 
and sniper rifles will not be as clear in their destructiveness as precision-guided 
munitions. Hence, in unconventional deterrence, there is an even greater possibility that 
the opponent will take a risk. 
Also, limited destructiveness is closely connected with the aggressors’ cost 
sensitivity, in both material and human terms. Since the deterrent threats need to change 
the aggressor’s cost-benefit calculations, there would always be a question, in 
unconventional deterrence, whether the cost that can be inflicted by unconventional 
deterrence is large enough to be “unbearable,” or unacceptable, for the aggressor. 
Because of the limited destructiveness of threats, it may be very rational that an aggressor 
would choose to suffer the cost. Thus, the degree to which the opponent is cost-sensitive 
is of high importance in unconventional deterrence. That is, the more the aggressor is 
insensitive to the cost, the more unreliable unconventional deterrence would be in 
practice.  
In addition to the possibility that the aggressor’s decision to attack and suffer a 
cost may be rational, because of the low destructiveness of unconventional threats, the 
prospects of deterrence success can be even more impaired by the “bounded”, or limited, 
rationality of an opponent. According to the concept of limited rationality (which seems 
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to be broadly acknowledged in deterrence theory as closely reflecting decision-making in 
practice), decision-making usually satisfies minimum criteria of rationality, or 
“reasonable” relationship between values, objectives, and decisions. At the same time, 
however, decision-making can suffer from a wide range of errors and misperceptions, 
such as, lack of information, group-think, time constraint, “analytic bias” (i.e., 
overestimating one’s and underestimating the opponent’s capabilities), general 
psychological (i.e., non-pathological) influences, miscalculations, cognitive biases, 
ignorance of low-probability outcomes, wishful thinking, etc. (Davis & Arquilla, 1991b). 
Therefore, Keith B. Payne suggests that it is necessary “to examine as closely as possible 
the particular opponent’s thinking – its beliefs and thought filters” (2003, p. xi). Although 
these subjective and contextual factors influencing the opponent’s decision-making are of 
high importance for any deterrence strategy, the present study argues that due to the low 
destructiveness of deterrent threats, the degree to which the opponent’s rationality is 
“bounded” matters even more in unconventional deterrence. In other words, the question 
is whether the low destructiveness of unconventional threats could get through the 
aggressor’s psychological and cognitive self-defensive mechanisms (e.g., wishful 
thinking, underestimation of deterrer’s capabilities, etc.). There is an argument in 
deterrence theory that the reliability of a nuclear deterrent rests on vast damage, which, 
supposedly, is so devastating in its effects that it overwhelms all self-defensive barriers in 
the opponent’s decision-making process. That is to say, that any eventual expression of 
limited rationality in the decision-making process becomes irrelevant, because only an 
insane opponent can choose to be undeterrable, knowing the devastating consequences. 
In contrast, the logic in unconventional deterrence seems to be completely the reverse. 
Due to the limited destructiveness of unconventional threats, it is more difficult to 
influence the opponent’s decision-making process. In other words, if the aggressor, for 
example, has a preconception that his “glorious army” cannot be defeated by “lousy 
guerrillas,” increasing the number of unconventional capabilities, most probably, would 
have little effect to change this predisposition.  
Hence, the limited destructiveness of unconventional threats seems to be a 
problem inherent in unconventional deterrence: to deter an opponent via threats of precise 
loss is more difficult than through threats of devastating damage. Therefore, it is 
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reasonable to suggest, that in unconventional deterrence, strategies and threats have to 
tailored very carefully and precisely to a specific opponent, his leadership, and his society 
in order to produce the desired deterrent effect. This thesis contends that the lower the 
destructiveness of threats, the more precise tailoring of threats to the opponent’s fears and 
vulnerabilities is needed. Most probably, for example, threats of cyber-terrorism would 
not have any deterrent effect for the opponent whose economy barely depends on 
information technologies. If the aggressor is not cost-sensitive in terms of human lives, 
the threats to target the relatives of decision-makers would, most likely, produce a better 
deterrent effect than would threats of indiscriminate terrorism. A low-intensity 
insurgency, perhaps, would be a deterrent if the leadership of a country has a 
preconception that the armed forces are meant to wage wars, not to build nations.  
It is worth noting, however, that the position taken here is that the limited 
destructiveness of unconventional threats is their inherent weakness, and the most 
problematic area of unconventional deterrence, may not necessarily be true, or as 
problematic as suggested. Freedman (2004) states that criminological studies on 
deterrence appear to suggest that increasing the severity of punishment has less effect 
than does increasing the certainty that the “crime” will result in some punishment (p. 64). 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find evidence whether this inference holds or not in 
deterrence among states. If it did, unconventional deterrence would be far less 
problematic than suggested in this study. However, it seems reasonable to argue that in 
either case, the weak would only increase the deterrent effect of their threats, by 
concentrating on boosting the level of certainty of some response to the aggression, 
notwithstanding the limited destructiveness of these threats. 
D. INTERNALIZED DETERRENCE 
One of the circumstances most favorable to the use of unconventional deterrence, 
seems to be, when it can reinforce already internalized fears of the opponent. 
Unfortunately, deterrence theory does not explicitly address the importance of tracking 
internalized fears, and reinforcing them in deterrence strategies. The “rule of thumb” of 
deterrence is identifying an aggressor’s values that can be threatened, and his 
vulnerabilities (Carns, 2001, p. 9), but not necessarily his internalized fears; fears that 
may, in fact, be different from his actual physical vulnerabilities. In other words, 
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deterrence theory does not consider the importance of an aggressor’s unfortunate 
experience in past or present wars, an aggressor’s awkwardness with some kinds of 
conflicts, or an aggressor’s “lessons learned” (i.e., lessons that may have resulted in some 
fears) in order to tailor deterrence strategies.  
Freedman (2004) satisfies this gap in the literature to a large degree by 
elaborating on the concept of internalized deterrence, which occurs when “deterrence is 
not being deliberately applied as a strategy, yet it still succeeds” (p. 29). In other words, 
internalized deterrence is a self-induced fear of the consequences, which can either have 
little basis in reality, or be a very accurate assessment of an opponent’s response to 
actions against his interests. The basic element is that the “deterrer” remains passive (i.e., 
does not apply any deliberate steps) in his influence on the opponent’s calculations.16 
According to Freedman (2004), “it is possible, indeed quite normal, to be persuaded 
against a particular course of action by the thought of how the target might respond. A 
would-be aggressor may thus be effectively deterred by an accurate assessment of the 
likely form of his potential victim’s response without the victim having to do very much” 
(p. 30).        
The best example of this kind of internalized deterrence, associated with 
unconventional deterrence strategies, is the aversion, especially of the US, to “small 
wars” (i.e., guerrilla conflicts). Gil Merom (2003) argues that, “the wish to avoid places 
and situations which can lead to small wars seems to govern the overall pattern of 
democratic interventions” (p. 247). It is usually argued that the fear of another Vietnam 
(the so-called “Vietnam syndrome”) was an implicit reason of the US consistent refusal 
to commit ground troops in Bosnia in 1992-93, and in Kosovo in 1999 (Erdmann, 2002, 
p. 47; Merom, 2003, p. 247). The same reason precluded any consideration of committing 
U.S. troops to combat in the El Salvador insurgency in 1980s. Carnes Lord (1998) 
suggests that Saddam Hussein regime’s survival in the first Gulf War, “was driven in a 
great measure by the desire of the military leadership to declare victory and disengage 
before being drawn into a Vietnam-like quagmire of low-intensity conflict.” Moreover, 
 
16 Sometimes, it is used the term ‘self-deterrence’ in policy debates. According to Freedman (2004), 
this phrase is wrong, because all deterrence in fact is self-deterrence: the intended deterree chooses to be 
deterred based on his calculations, whatever the quality of the threats (p. 30).    
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the U.S. fear of small wars, or, more precisely, the Vietnam lessons, are institutionalized 
in the Weinberger Doctrine of 1984, and in the subsequent, so-called, “Powell and 
Cheney” doctrines, which set preconditions for the U.S. military engagements: the U.S. 
national interest must be vital and clearly threatened; and the U.S. must employ 
overwhelming forces to win, not only decisively, but also quickly (Luttwak, 1995, p. 112; 
Merom, 2003, pp. 246-247; Lord, 1998). However, going beyond the U.S. examples, it is 
difficult to argue, without extensive analysis, whether the unfortunate experience in small 
wars always leaves some kind of internalized fears for frustrated great powers. Merom 
(2003) argues this is true for democracies. Most likely, for example, we would find 
internalized deterrence concerning guerrilla conflicts in Russia’s strategic culture as well, 
based on the lost war in Afghanistan, and the continuing conflict in Chechnya.  
According to Freedman (2004), there is nothing abnormal if an actor is deterred, 
even if there is no direct interaction. On the contrary, Freedman says internalized 
deterrence is a common phenomenon in practice. From the strategic perspective, 
however, the problem is not the existence of internalized deterrence, but “the 
development of strategies designed to produce a reliable deterrent effect” (p. 32). What is 
of high importance for unconventional deterrence is that weak states need to track the 
internal fears of great powers and adopt strategies that seek to reinforce and play on this 
internalized deterrence. If an opponent is averse to small wars, it is logical to threaten 
him with the prospects of guerrilla resistance, should he attack. If he had a bad 
experience in dealing with terrorism on a previous occasion (whether domestic or 
international), he would probably consider the prospects of punishment via retaliatory 
terrorist attacks more seriously. It is reasonable to argue that, to the degree that 
internalized deterrence exists in an opponent’s strategic culture, unconventional 
deterrence strategies would be more feasible and credible. 
E. CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS 
Looking for conditions of successful deterrence has been the basic area of 
research of deterrence scholars. The fact that deterrence has been one of those rare 
theoretical concepts that has been both vitally important and practical, theoreticians have 
been forced toward analyzing the requirements for deterrence that could enable states to 
adopt effective and credible deterrent policies. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the 
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substantial body of theoretical and empirical works available, the more common 
conclusions appear to be contrary to expectations, namely that deterrence is inherently 
unreliable, and that there is no way of finding the general formula of conditions under 
which deterrence is likely to succeed or fail. However, theoretical and empirical findings 
suggest a number of widely agreed upon conditions, which can be useful in shaping 
coherent deterrence strategies.  
In general, two facets of successful deterrence are usually discussed in the studies 
– capabilities and credibility. In other words, for deterrence to succeed, the deterrer must 
have the means to implement his threats, and the aggressor must believe that the threats 
will be implemented. Watman and Wilkening (1995) state that overall, successful 
deterrence is a function of these two elements, and that the lack of one can be 
compensated, to some extent, by an abundance of the other. That is, a strong will to act 
can compensate for less certain military capability, and, similarly, overwhelming military 
capability can compensate for some uncertainty about the will to act. However, if either 
of them is assessed to be zero, the overall reliability of deterrence would be zero, as well 
(p. 57). 
Huth (1999) contends that deterrence theorists have focused on four sets of 
variables: the balance of military forces, signaling and bargaining behavior, reputation, 
and interests at stake (p. 25). While the first is associated with the concept of a party’s 
capabilities, the latter three are facets of credibility. The concept of “strategy,” an 
additional facet of a party’s capabilities, will also be discussed, as well as two elements 
of credibility – legitimacy and will. Although these are not broadly accepted as key 
determinants in deterrence theory, they may matter for unconventional deterrence. As 
well, it is worth noting that, because we find that only the concept of capabilities appears 
to function differently, somehow, in unconventional deterrence, from the way it functions 
in classic deterrence theory, the concept of credibility is not so extensively discussed. 
1. Capabilities 
a. Military Balance 
Although the importance of the balance of military capabilities is an 
unsettled issue in deterrence theory, the military capabilities between deterrer and 
attacker have been given the most attention in analyzing deterrence situations (Huth & 
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Russett, 1984, p. 501). As mentioned above, the underlying hypothesis of commonly-held 
deterrence theory is based on military balance. This is clearly shown by Russet (1994) 
when he writes, “shifts in the military balance in favor of the defender will make 
challenges less likely, whereas shifts in the military balance in favor of the challenger 
will make challenge more likely” (p. 41). It seems that because of this focus on military 
balance, the possibility of the weak deterring the strong is not discussed at all, in 
deterrence theory. The weak state, by default, is militarily inferior to the greater power. 
Even though, as Morgan (2003) suggests, “the military superiority is not the key for 
successful deterrence” (p. 165), the tacit agreement among scholars is that the deterrer 
needs to be somewhat evenly matched with the aggressor, in terms of levels of force 
possessed. As Mearsheimer (1983) elaborates on a position that appears to be a point of 
view shared by the majority of deterrence scholars, if the lack of balance of military 
forces between antagonists is overwhelming, deterrence does not work, because the 
strong is able, literally, to overrun the underdog (p. 59). In theory, the only exception 
would be the notion of finite deterrence, when the weak may deter an attack by a great 
power, because the stronger power fears being weakened vis-à-vis another great power, 
especially during times of war (Handel, 1981, p. 92, p. 258). 
Concerning the balance of military capabilities, several studies have found 
that local, or short-term, military balance is more important than strategic, or long-term, 
capabilities (for example, Huth, 1988). In other words, having the capabilities to repulse 
an attack from the very outset, thus, preventing a quick and decisive victory, increases the 
prospect of the deterrence being successful. Although this finding, per se, is not very 
relevant for the weak (i.e., rarely can underdogs match great powers, even in terms of 
short-term military capabilities), the explication of this finding is of high importance for 
unconventional deterrence. In essence, the conclusion that the prospect of a deterrence’s 
success increases significantly if the defender has military capabilities to prevent a quick 
victory, rests on the argument that aggressors prefer to utilize their military forces quickly 
and decisively, and do not like protracted and expensive wars (Mearsheimer, 1983; Huth, 
1988, 1999; Watman & Wilkening, 1995; Glaser & Kaufman, 1998). According to Huth 
(1999), “the strategic orientation of potential attackers is generally short-term and driven 
by concerns about military cost and mission effectiveness” (p. 31). What this implies for 
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deterrence is that “deterrence is best served when the attacker believes that his only 
alternative is a protracted war” (Mearsheimer, 1983, p. 64). Likewise, Watman and 
Wilkening (1995) suggest that if denying the adversary a quick, cheap victory is most 
important, the military capabilities that can perform that task are most relevant for 
deterrence (p. 68). 
This leads to the inference that military capabilities that can deny a cheap 
and quick victory have the greatest deterrent influence (Watman & Wilkening, 1995, p. 
67). It also has direct application for the use of guerrilla warfare tactics, which, in 
essence, is all about protracting a war instead of trying to defeat the opponent in decisive 
battles. In turn, this implies that the weak state, which cannot match-up with the great 
power, in terms of long- and short-term military capabilities, may likely increase the 
deterrent effect of its forces by focusing on a guerrilla warfare approach, and threatening 
the aggressor with a protracted guerrilla war. According to Thomas X. Hammes (2004), 
this is precisely the message that the Iraqi insurgents are sending for the US – “You are 
engaged in an endless, unwinnable fight.” Of course, deterrence requires having such 
capabilities, and communicating such messages in advance, not after the war has started. 
To be precise, most of the above mentioned theoreticians, when 
elaborating on the notion that aggressors do not like protracted and costly wars, specify 
that they are speaking about ‘wars of attrition’.17 In fact, this should preclude the present 
study from using their inferences, because in strictly strategic terms, guerrilla war is a 
war of exhaustion, not of attrition. However, it is reasonable to believe that aggressors 
would not like long wars of exhaustion, anymore than they would wars of attrition, as 
long as they are protracted, costly, and preclude aggressors from obtaining quick 
victories, and the realization of their political objectives. Definitely, all things being 
equal, a long war of attrition would be more costly than that would a war of fighting 
guerrillas. However, this does not mean that guerrilla resistance cannot protract a war and 
make it costly, in both human and material terms. Handel (1981) suggests that guerrilla 
warfare has enormously raised the human and material cost for any intervening power (p. 
 
17 The authors do not explicate why protracted wars should be necessary that of attrition in order to be 
disliked by aggressors. Most likely, they tacitly assume that only wars of attrition are costly enough for the 
aggressors. In general, they omit guerrilla wars in their analysis, most likely to simplify them. 
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273). After discussing the cost of the Vietnam War for the US, Handel (1981) concludes 
that, “the days when a hundred United States Marines disguised as legation guards in 
Nicaragua could control and maintain peace in a weak country are over” (p. 275). 
In sum, unconventional capabilities can have deterrent effects, if the 
aggressor believes that he can be prevented from obtaining a quick and cheap victory. 
The problematic aspect, however, is that guerrilla warfare appears to defy all the rules of 
calculating offensive/defensive force, and force-to-space ratios.18 In other words, military 
balance, the facet of deterrence that has received the most attention in analyzing 
deterrence situations, becomes useless as an analytical tool if the deterrer threatens to 
deny the aggressor of his objectives, via engaging him in a guerrilla war. In case of 
employing terrorism as a means of punishment, the military balance would be even more 
irrelevant. Concerning guerrilla warfare, at least, it is logical to argue that the more troops 
an aggressor has on the ground, the more difficult it would be for guerrillas to operate. 
However, if the deterrer threatens to punish the aggressor’s population with terrorist acts, 
the aggressor’s superior military capabilities become irrelevant to a large degree. 
Therefore, it appears that in unconventional deterrence, the sheer numbers of military 
forces available for both sides does not matter as much as does the deterrer’s strategy. In 
other words, if the weak state is able to adopt a strategy that decreases the utility of the 
aggressor’s military capabilities, increases prospects of protracting the war, and threatens 
to deny an aggressor his political objectives, even considerably inferior military 
capabilities can have some deterrent effect.  
b. Strategy 
Both military capabilities and a strategy, or a plan of employing armed 
forces to achieve military and/or political objectives (Arreguin-Toft, 2001, p. 99), are 
integral parts of overall military power. It is logical to argue that armed forces, no matter 
how enormous they are, will never unfold their full potential without a coherent and 
elaborate plan of how they are to be employed. More importantly, as Thomas G. 
Mahnken (1993) suggests, “military effectiveness is the result of developing a strategy to 
 
18 T. E. Lawrence’s attempt to shape guerrilla warfare into the exact science (including calculations of 
force ratios) is usually criticized as having resulted in overly broad generalizations, and not having much 
explanatory power. See on Lawrence’s approach to guerrilla warfare, for example, Laqeuer (1998, pp. 169-
171), Beckett (2001, pp. 19-20), and Asprey (1994, pp. 179-191).  
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pit one’s strengths against an opponent’s weaknesses.” However, notwithstanding this 
natural inextricable link between military force and strategy, deterrence theory focuses 
only on balance of military capabilities. With the exception of nuclear deterrence (which 
considers targeting strategies), the strategies of opponents appears to be largely irrelevant 
as being determinates for success or failure in deterrence theory. 
A notable exception to this is Mearsheimer’s (1983) analysis of the 
importance of interaction of opponents’ strategies for deterrence outcomes. He postulates 
that, “conventional deterrence is directly related to military strategy, or more specifically, 
to the matter of how a nation’s armed forces are employed to achieve specific battlefield 
objectives” (p. 28). Mearsheimer concludes that deterrence is most likely to obtain if the 
deterrer is able to deny the aggressor a successful “blitzkrieg” option (i.e., achieving a 
quick and decisive victory), thus, making a protracted war of attrition a certainty. 
However, he narrows his analysis only to conventional deterrence, and states, in 
straightforward fashion, that his theory does not apply to guerrilla wars, such as the 
Vietnam War (p. 15). Because of this omission of guerrilla warfare as a strategy of war, 
Mearsheimer, as mentioned above, comes to the orthodox conclusion that the military 
balance matters when he claims that, only when opponents possess about equal military 
capabilities, does strategy become a determinant of deterrence. Yet if the Vietnam War, 
or other guerrilla conflict, had been included in the Mearsheimer’s analysis, his 
conclusion – “deterrence is largely a function of military strategy” (p. 7) – would have 
been more general and more broadly applicable. It appears to be reasonable to suggest 
that if a military strategy can be adopted to deny an opponent his objectives or prevent a 
fait accompli, strategy will matter in any kind of deterrence, not only in conventional 
deterrence.  
In unconventional deterrence, strategy appears to be of a high importance 
for determining a deterrence’s success or failure. Because weak states will never be able 
to match great powers, in terms of military might, their adoption of the right strategy is 
the only option to increase the deterrent effect of their inferior military capabilities. As 
Athanassios G. Platias (1994) posits, “in the confrontation of two unequal states, the 
small state’s success in dissuading a possible attack is highly dependant on a strategy it 
adopts” (p. 45). In other words, Platias (1994) offers a highly relevant insight for 
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unconventional deterrence – for a small state, a strategy can make the difference between 
the success and failure of deterrence (p. 59). However, this author fails to elaborate what 
strategies are those that can be adopted by the weak to maximize the deterrent effect. In 
turn, Platias concludes that qualitative superiority – e.g., superior technology, military 
organization, and operational methods – is a way to maximize deterrence without having 
to match, in quantity, the adversary’s forces (1994, p. 59). However, this notion of 
qualitative superiority easily fits into the balance of military capabilities (i.e., calculations 
of balance of military capabilities usually includes the qualitative differences, as well), 
and has little to do with the strategies adopted.     
In brief, unconventional deterrence appears to be a necessity for the weak 
state, vis-à-vis a greater power, because weak states will have, neither enough short-term 
military capabilities to repulse the attack, nor long-term, or strategic, capabilities to 
threaten aggressors with a protracted war of attrition. Thus, guerrilla warfare, as a denial 
strategy, and terrorism, as a punishment strategy, are two ways for underdogs to 
maximize deterrence: while guerrilla warfare strategy protracts a conflict, terrorism 
makes most of the aggressor’s military capabilities irrelevant. 
2. Credibility 
a. Balance of Motivations 
The “balance of motivations,” and its main element, interests at stake, 
seem to be the most readily analyzed aspect of credibility in deterrence situations. In fact, 
while the balance of military forces is the main component of capabilities, the balance of 
motivations is the main element of credibility. According to Watman and Wilkening 
(1995), “classical deterrence theory has long stressed the importance of strength of 
interests as a means of making deterrence threats credible to the adversary” (p. 6). In 
addition, it appears that the motivations of opponents, as a determinant for deterrence 
success or failure, has become, over time, more emphasized in deterrence theory. For 
example, Freedman (2004) states that interests represent the most likely independent 
variable in many deterrence situations (p. 47). Likewise, Morgan (2003) appears to argue 
that the opponents’ motivations play a very important role in determining deterrence 
outcomes (p. 288). 
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The balance of motivations is mostly a function of interests at stake, or the 
“balance of interest.” However, besides interests, a few intangible elements also appear to 
be a part the overall balance of motivations. Although such intangible aspects – which are 
considered as the components of “will” in this study19 – as readiness to sacrifice, national 
cohesiveness, religious faith, bellicosity, etc. are not easily analyzable or measurable, 
they may amplify (or de-emphasize), to some degree, the interests at stakes in deterrence 
situations. For example, entrenched religious dogmas to fight “infidels” would likely 
amplify the aggressor’s perception of the deterrer’s interests at stake. On the other hand, 
the lack of national cohesiveness may deemphasize the importance of territorial integrity. 
As well, it is worth noting that although will seems to be a relatively important element 
for the balance of motivations in deterrence situations, in general, some of the facets of 
will may have a particularly great influence for boosting unconventional deterrence 
strategies. For example, since guerrilla resistance requires population support, the 
cohesiveness of population (i.e., perceived by the enemy) may increase significantly the 
credibility of unconventional deterrence. Hence, the balance of motivations is not strictly 
associated only with interests at stake, and even though they are the main element, they 
can be reinforced or diminished by some intangible aspects of will. 
Concerning the concept of interests at stake, deterrence theory “predicts 
that if the balance of interests favors the defender deterrence should hold” (Lieberman, 
1995, p. 7). Deterrence theory usually explains the functioning of balance of interests, in 
practice, in terms of the resolve to use force, and, especially, willingness to suffer 
military losses. In other words, the more the issues at stake matter for the opponents, the 
more they are prepared to suffer to protect these interests (Freedman, 2004, p. 47). 
Regarding unconventional deterrence, or, more precisely, deterrence of the strong by the 
weak, the question is whether it is possible to establish some logic predicting the eventual 
balance of interests. This thesis posits that, in most situations, the asymmetry of interests 
would likely be in favor of the weak, because the greater power’s attack on the weak state 
would most probably threaten the national survival of the latter. In contrast, the stronger 
 
19 The concept of will is sometimes used alternatively with the concept of credibility in deterrence 
studies. We think that the credibility is much more complex than the term “will” suggests. Therefore, we 
use the concept of will more narrowly, indicating such obscure intangible aspects as national cohesion, 
religious fervor, etc., which may or may not amplify or reduce overall credibility.         
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parties usually do not need to choose between survival and non-survival while 
considering attacking the weaker. However strong and strategically important his 
interests are, they probably would not be greater than that of national survival, or even 
‘regime survival’. Even if the greater power’s attack is limited in its aims, and does not 
threaten the national or regime survival of the weak, territorial integrity is usually 
considered as an essential interest. As Freedman (2004) suggests, attack on sovereign 
territory is the attack on “the most vital of all vital issues” (p. 35). Pape also (1996) 
argues that deterrence is made easier by the “aggressor’s handicap” – the homeland is 
normally more valuable to the defender than it is to the aggressor (p. 6). This is not to 
say, however, that, in all situations, the balance of interest would be in favor for the weak 
by default. In territorial disputes, for example, the aggressor may also see the disputed 
territory as a part of his national homeland. However, even in situations when the 
opponents assess the stakes more or less equally, prospect theory suggests that the overall 
balance of motivations would likely be in favor of the defender: “even if both value the 
stakes equally, the attacker, who stands to make gains, is likely to be more risk averse 
than the defender, who stands to suffer losses” (Pape, 1996, p. 7). 
In addition, it is generally acknowledged in deterrence theory, that direct 
deterrence, or deterring an attack against one’s territory, is considered easier and more 
credible than extended deterrence, or deterring an attack on an ally. As Thomas Schelling 
elaborates, “the difference between national homeland and everything ‘abroad’ is the 
difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and threats that 
have to be made credible” (as cited in Platias, 1994, p. 54). As well, deterrence theory 
suggests a distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘strategic’ interests. Intrinsic interests, or 
the inherent value of the object or issue at stake, are considered to be more important, 
and, thus, more deterring, than are merely strategic interests, defined by Jervis as the 
“degree to which a retreat would endanger the state’s position on other issues” (as cited 
in Freedman, 2004, p. 46). Thus, relevant to the discussion here, is the supposition that 
the weak state trying to deter great power would, in fact, practice the type of deterrence 
that is easier and more credible (i.e., direct deterrence), and would defend the interests 
that are more deterring (i.e., intrinsic interests).  
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Summing up, in deterrence situations when the weak are trying to deter 
the strong, the balance of motivations would likely be in favor of the weak. Since 
sovereignty is usually perceived as the most vital issue at stake, it is reasonable to believe 
that the greater power’s interests, however strategically important, would rarely match 
the weak state’s interest at stake. As well, whereas the greater power’s decision to attack, 
or not attack, would rarely be identified with a question of national survival, for the weak, 
this question looms large when facing the attack of a stronger opponent. Although, 
suggested here is the notion that direct deterrence is inherently more credible than 
extended deterrence, and that intrinsic interests are more deterring than strategic, that 
does not mean that the weaker state can neglect emphasizing the asymmetry of interests 
in bargaining strategies. Notwithstanding the inherent credibility concerning the interest 
and motivations, the weak would only strengthen the deterrent effect of its strategies by 
continually accentuating the asymmetry of issues at stake.  
b. Reputation 
Reputation, or a “state’s record of past behavior,” is another principle 
determiner of deterrence credibility (Watman & Wilkening, 1995, p. 58). Deterrence 
theory suggests that the deterrer’s past behavior may have important effects on the 
attacker’s calculations. However, both in theory and in practice, the difficulty is that 
“reputation is intangible and difficult to measure and identify” (Freedman, 2004, p. 53). 
In other words, it is difficult to establish the extent to which reputation is important for 
deterrence success or failure. Huth (1999) appears to conclude that reputation is the least 
elaborated upon variable in deterrence theory. He suggests that our knowledge is limited 
to identifying “when reputations form and what impact they have on deterrence” (p. 44).  
Concerning the importance of reputations for deterrence credibility, views 
vary from the assertion that the deterrer’s past behavior creates strong beliefs about his 
behavior in the future crisis and has strong influence on the aggressor’s decision whether 
to challenge deterrence, to the argument that reputations are largely irrelevant for 
deterrence outcomes, because aggressors usually pay more attention to the current 
specificities (e.g., balance of military capabilities, issues at stake, and signals received 
from the deterrer), and do not think that the past behavior is a reliable predictor of future 
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behavior.20 Huth (1999) concludes that empirical evidence does not strongly support any 
of these views (pp. 41-43). He suggests that reputation is limited in its effects, and that 
the deterrer’s past behavior in the conflicts with other states has no significant impact on 
deterrence outcomes in many deterrence situations (p. 42). However, he says, 
reputational influences can be important (p. 43). Huth proposes an intermediate position – 
“reputations can form and be important but only under certain conditions” (p. 33). Most 
likely, reputations are important when they contradict the aggressor’s assessment of case-
specific variables, and when they arise from the past record of interactions between the 
same deterrer and aggressor. As well, reputations that are important tend to be formed 
within the same geographic region, and may have important effects on the aggressor’s 
calculations, only for a relatively short period of time (because of the changes in strategic 
environment, leadership changes, etc.) (Huth, 1999). Likewise, Lieberman (1995) 
suggests that only ‘specific reputations’ (or reputations that are context dependant) are 
important. “New situations give rise to new uncertainties. Specific reputations developed 
in other situations are irrelevant to the new circumstances” (Lieberman, 1995, p. 30). 
Following the logic of these inferences, this thesis also proposes that in 
unconventional deterrence, only context dependent reputations would likely have an 
important impact on the aggressor’s calculations. Most probably, if the aggressor has 
already lost a guerrilla war against the same deterrer, reputation would have the strongest 
effect for the credibility of unconventional deterrence. For example, if Vietnam or 
Lebanon employed unconventional deterrence against the US and Israel, respectively, 
there would be a high probability that the deterrers’ reputations would influence the 
calculations of potential aggressors. On the other hand, if the deterrer has been crushingly 
defeated in a conventional war against the same potential attacker, the credibility of 
unconventional deterrence, probably, would not be greatly influenced by the reputation of 
a “miserable” conventional force’s performance on the battlefield. The deterrer may, 
rather, exploit this shift of defensive strategies to his own advantage, by emphasizing his 
strategic adaptability, and learning the “lessons-learned.” The established reputations of 
national cohesion and nationalistic fervor may also have an effect on the aggressor’s 
 
20 See Huth (1997) for a detail discussion on reputations. Concerning reputations’ impact on 
deterrence outcome, Huth (1999) identifies three views: strong-interdependence-of-commitments position; 
qualified-interdependence-of-commitments position; and case-specific-credibility position.  
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calculation, since guerrilla warfare is dependent on the active and passive support of 
populations. Concerning the retaliatory terrorist strikes, the reputation of the deterrer’s 
leadership, as being associated with some terrorist activities in the past, would likely 
diminish the aggressor’s belief that the deterrer may be not be willing to respond to 
aggression with terrorist strikes. However, shifts in strategic environment could make the 
deterrer’s reputations concerning unconventional war irrelevant, to some extent. For 
example, if the aggressor believes that he has developed a good counter-insurgency, and 
counter-terrorism techniques, the significance of a deterrer’s reputation, specific to 
unconventional deterrence, may decrease in aggressor’s calculations.  
c. Bargaining Strategy  
In deterrence theory, bargaining strategy is considered to be a component 
of deterrence credibility. The general assertion, according to Lieberman, is “that the 
crisis-bargaining-behavior of the defender influences deterrence outcomes” (Lieberman, 
1995, p. 31). Huth (1999) defines a deterrer’s bargaining behavior as being a function of 
conveying signals to the aggressor about the deterrer’s interests at stake, intentions, and 
resolve (p. 37). However, views differ considerably regarding the extent to which 
bargaining strategies are important for deterrence outcome. While Watman and 
Wilkening (1995) appear to see bargaining tactics as a lesser factor, which simply 
amplifies the perception of interests and reputations (p. 60), Huth (1999) argues that “the 
studies of crisis bargaining indicate that military or diplomatic actions of defenders can 
have strong effects on whether deterrence succeeds or fails” (p. 37). 
In brief, concerning particular bargaining behavior, Huth (1988, 1999) 
concludes that “firm-but-flexible” bargaining strategies and “tit-for-tat” military policies 
are more effective as deterrents than either more aggressive and intransigent, or very 
cautious and conciliatory diplomatic and military stance. As well, inclusion of positive 
inducements can increase the likelihood of deterrence success, according to Huth: 
“diplomatic policies that include flexibility and a willingness to compromise and 
negotiate on secondary issue, combined with a refusal to concede on vital security, 
increase the likelihood of deterrence success” (Huth, 1999, p. 38). Overall, Huth (1999) 
suggests  that  “Schelling’s school” of the manipulation of risk, inflexible commitment,  
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and “costly” signals strategies, have not been fully supported by empirical evidence, and 
that the “carrot-and-stick” approach, or combination threats and positive inducements, 
increases the likelihood of successful deterrence. 
In regard to unconventional deterrence, there is no evidence to suggest that 
bargaining behavior should be somehow conceptually different. That is to say, that the 
role of bargaining strategies in unconventional deterrence is the same – as a means to 
signal interests, intentions, and resolve for an aggressor. Because unconventional threats 
are not so impressive and self-evident, clearly conveying threats to the opponent may 
have a strong effect for deterrence outcome. As well, some kind of flexibility, 
reassurance, and willingness to compromise on secondary issues, if situation allows, 
would presumably increase the deterrent effect of overall unconventional deterrence 
strategy.  
d. Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is not considered as being a determinant of deterrence 
outcome in deterrence theory, and is rarely discussed by deterrence theoreticians. 
Watman and Wilkening (1995), one of those exceptions, see legitimacy as a facet of 
credibility, also agreeing that legitimacy is a lesser factor, and difficult to determine (p. 
60). Notwithstanding this disregard for legitimacy, it will be discussed, briefly, in this 
study, because of the perception of illegitimate aspects of some unconventional 
deterrence threats (e.g., assassinations of politico-military leadership), and terrorism in 
particular. However, it must be acknowledged that legitimacy is a complex phenomenon 
of international relations, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate is not so clear-
cut. Concerning terrorism, the problem goes beyond international law and, in essence, 
touches the just war theory, and the principles of jus in bello and jus ad bellum. 
Therefore, the present study stays within the limits of the question as how legitimacy can 
affect deterrence credibility, and does not discuss whether terrorism, as such, or targeting 
civilians, in general (thus, the problem goes even beyond terrorism), can be a “just” 
warfighting technique. 
In general, deterrence theory considers legitimacy, only in the light of 
credibility. In other words, it does not matter whether interests or means are legitimate, as 
such. Legitimacy becomes important only when it can impair credibility – if the 
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aggressor believes that the deterrer thinks about his defended interest as being 
illegitimate, the aggressor can discount the threats, expecting that the deterrer may back 
down after the attack, and not implement the threats. Watman and Wilkening (1995) 
suggest that deterrence credibility does not require that the opponents would share this 
perception of legitimacy. All that is required, is that the aggressor believes the deterrer 
holds his belief about legitimacy of his interests and means (p. 61). In other words, the 
deterrer does not need to convince the aggressor about the legitimacy of the deterrer’s 
defended interests, or used means for deterrence to be credible. The deterrer only needs to 
convince the aggressor that the deterrer believes his interests and means are legitimate. 
Therefore, in unconventional deterrence, the problem is not that some defending methods 
are illegitimate, per se, but how the weak can convey the message that they treat these 
defensive methods as legitimate, and the implementation of threats will not be impaired. 
Watman and Wilkening (1995) identify two elements that can be 
perceived as being either legitimate or illegitimate – i.e., a deterrer’s interests and 
methods of defense (p. 60). Concerning the deterrer’s interests in direct deterrence, it 
seems that the attacker would rarely believe that the deterrer perceives his interests as 
being illegitimate. Since sovereignty is an entrenched principle in international relations, 
and the defense of national territory is considered to be a vital interest, it would be 
unreasonable for the aggressor to believe that the deterrer considers his interests 
illegitimate. In addition, defense of the status quo is associated with legitimacy, per se. In 
contrast, attackers bear the burden of disturbing the status quo (Pape, 1996, p. 6). What is 
important for unconventional deterrence, is that the weak can exploit this inherent 
legitimacy of interests to balance, to some extent, the perceived illegitimacy of defensive 
means, and, thereby, to convince the aggressor that the deterrer believes his defensive 
means are legitimate. In other words, by stressing that the deterrer sees as legitimate all 
defensive means (be they nuclear strikes, terrorism, or any other technique) to protect the 
legitimate interest, sovereignty and status quo, he may diminish the aggressor’s doubts 
that threats are going to be implemented. 
Concerning the legitimacy of defensive mechanisms in unconventional 
deterrence, the problem is more complicated. It may be reasonable for the aggressor to 
believe that the perceived illegitimacy of defensive means can handicap the 
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implementation of threats. However, even at this point of time, it appears that some weak 
states (e.g., Iran, Sudan) could easily convince the potential aggressor that they would 
retaliate by terrorist strikes in response to attacks on their homelands. Because of their 
leadership reputations, associations with terrorist activities in the past, and, apparently, 
not so rigid approach to terrorism as a fighting technique, the aggressor would likely 
believe that the threats would be implemented notwithstanding their connotation with 
illegitimacy. Other weak states may emphasize the defensive, in contrast to offensive, use 
of terrorism in their public diplomacy, in order to diminish the negative connotation. 
Punitive retaliation by terrorist acts, in fact, is conceptually the same as counter-value 
strategies in nuclear deterrence. In both cases, the targets are civilian populations. Thus, 
weak states could emphasize that their deterrence strategies function in the same way as 
that of greater powers. In other words, public diplomacy could question why the weak 
should be limited in their defensive strategies while the stronger can target civilians in 
their strategies. The question could be stressed, what is more illegitimate and unethical – 
vast damage of nuclear strikes, or limited destruction of terrorist strikes? On the other 
hand, if the weak state, itself, doubts the legitimacy of terrorist threats or/and finds it 
difficult to convince an aggressor that the threats will be implemented, notwithstanding 
that the aggressor perceives them as illegitimate, the weak could concentrate their 




                                                
III. SMALL WAR PHENOMENON 
You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American 
colonel. 
The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. “That 
may be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant. 
Conversation in Hanoi, April 197521
The Iraq War of 2003, once again, has raised the “small war” phenomenon to the 
fore. Although it is too early to make general conclusions, or speculate about what has 
been called “the second Vietnam,” it is, apparently, evident that the world’s only 
superpower, the U.S., has had difficulties in realizing its aims and, thus, ending the war. 
History suggests that even underdogs sometimes do win wars against 
considerably superior belligerents. One could argue that that is just a matter of accident, 
the result of a Clausewitzian “fog of war.” However, it seems that too many examples of 
this may have occurred – for instance, the Peninsular War, the Algerian war of 1954-62, 
the Vietnam War of 1964-73, the Afghanistan War of 1979-89, the Lebanon war of 1982-
83, the Chechnya War of 1994-96, etc., to ignore this as being a paradoxical 
phenomenon. On the other hand, and more typically, there are plenty of counter-
examples, i.e., where the weak have lost wars, occasionally with their population even 
being exterminated. However, these cases conform to the “iron rule of power.” What 
seems counterintuitive (due to overall Western predominance) is that in the 20th century 
“underdogs seem to have done rather well in small wars” (Merom, 2003, p. 4). This same 
idea has also been observed by Ivan Arreguín-Toft (2001), who infers that weak actors 
are increasingly winning asymmetric conflicts (p. 99). 
As mentioned above, some theoreticians of small wars have been trying to 
determine the dynamics of small wars.22 In other words, the question is whether there 
exists some logic, or determinants,  behind this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon – i.e., 
 
21 Conversation on 25 April 1975 in Hanoi between Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. and Colonel Tu. 
As cited in Summers, 1995, p. 1.  
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an underdog’s victory over a stronger opponent. Concerning unconventional deterrence, 
in general, and deterrence by the weak, in particular, the small war phenomenon matters 
in two ways. First, if an underdog’s victory in war against the strong does not have any 
basis in logic, and appears to be only an incidental aberration, unconventional deterrence 
would seem to be very problematic. That is to say, it would be unreliable to threaten the 
strong, in order to deny him his objectives (at least with particular types of resistance), if 
underdog victories are accidental, rather than being a predictable result. Second, insights 
from discussions on small wars can suggest a number of conditions that may influence 
the outcome of unconventional deterrence – ones that can either be created by the weak, 
or that are intrinsic to the deterree (and the international system in which the opponents 
interact). 
A. APPROACHES TO THE SMALL WAR PHENOMENON 
1. Realism and Structuralism 
The small war phenomenon is rather illogical, in itself – i.e., the notion that 
underdogs can prevail in conflicts against antagonists who are superior, in every respect. 
Victories by underdogs are a paradox for realism, particularly (Merom, 2003, p. 5). The 
idea that the weak are able to win against the strong seriously deflates the realist 
argument that power, defined in terms of military capabilities, in particular, and 
economic resources, in general, determines who wins and who loses. Since Thucydides, 
the fundamental principle of international relations has been that “power implies victory 
in war” (Arreguín-Toft, 2001, p. 94). In the orthodox mindset, the underdog’s victory 
would mean that he is not an underdog any more. It is interesting to note that, on the 
balance of military capabilities, the emphasis of deterrence theory fits entirely into the 
logic of realism.  
The most feasible explanation of small wars, fitting this balance-of-power 
paradigm of realism theory, is both an over-extension of power, as well as an omen 
signaling the decline of hegemony. According to Robert Gilpin, hegemons expand to the 
 
22 A plethora of terms, such as asymmetric war, low-intensity conflict, military operations other than 
war, 4th generation war, etc., is used alternatively with the concept of small war. However, these appear to 
be much broader concepts than we discuss. For the purpose of this paper, we borrow Merom’s (2003) 
definition: “A small war has the following characteristics: It involves sharp military asymmetry, an 
insurgent that fights guerrilla war, and an incumbent that uses ground forces for counterinsurgency warfare. 
The incumbent can be an indigenous government that fights on its own or with external participation, or a 
foreign power that imposes itself on the population” (p. 4).  
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point when costs exceed benefits (as cited in Merom, 2003, p. 6). Paul Kennedy appears 
to take the same view, and warns that “imperial over-extension” is the greatest risk to the 
United States, because, even such an enormous power, lacks the capacity to deploy her 
troops to dozens of hot-spots throughout the world – e.g., Iraq; Afghanistan; likely, to 
Liberia; Iran; Syria; and North Korea (as cited in Follath, 2003). Although this argument 
does not contemplate small wars, in particular, it does imply that overextension of power 
permits the weak “to create a favorable balance of power in their vicinity” (Merom, 2003, 
p. 6).  
Another approach to small wars, closely connected with the perspective of the 
balance-of-power paradigm, follows structuralist argumentation – i.e., that a great power 
should be prepared to defend its status and interests against other would-be great powers. 
That is to say, great powers cannot afford to allocate a large part of their efforts to wars 
that do not threaten their survival, and cannot generate major systemic changes in the 
international system. According to Robert M. Cassidy (2002), “great powers do not win 
small wars because they are great powers: their militaries must maintain a central 
competence in symmetric warfare to preserve their great-power status vis-à-vis other 
great powers” (p. 14). For example, one of the explanations why the US and the Soviet 
Union failed in their “major” small wars – i.e., the US in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union 
in Afghanistan – is that, during the Cold War, both superpowers had to concentrate their 
resources on the nuclear arms race and conventional wars on the plains of Europe. In 
other words, great powers have to embrace a big-war paradigm by necessity (Cassidy, 
2003, p. v). Structuralism suggests that, the great power’s position in the international 
system, inherently creates tensions between its allocation of resources. However, the 
priority will always be placed on readiness to counter would-be great powers, rather than 
on dealing with skirmishes in the peripheral zones of the international system. 
Both the balance-of-power paradigm and the structuralism approach especially 
stress the relevance of overextension-of-power and structural-constraint arguments during 
major, or systemic, wars. That is to say, great powers need to concentrate their resources 
and efforts on other strong antagonists during their major wars, thus making the 
guerrillas’  struggle  more  efficient  in  non-major  war  areas. From  this  point  of  view,  
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Napoleon gave up Spain because he needed his forces for the invasion of Russia. For the 
same reason, guerrillas in the Balkans successfully resisted Hitler’s forces; and Britain 
gave up their American colonies, due to troubles elsewhere (Merom, 2003, p. 6).  
Although these arguments of an over-extension of power and structural 
constraints cannot explain the small war phenomenon by themselves, their insights may 
be relevant for unconventional deterrence, at least, in theory. First, unconventional 
deterrence, most probably, would seem most feasible when a strong warring nation faces 
a dozen other “hot spots” throughout its zones of influence, and perceives its military 
capabilities as being on the edge of being overextended. Bearing in mind the efficiency of 
guerrilla tactics in tieing down much larger conventional units, or in protracting a 
conflict, and in preventing stronger opponents from ending a war in just several decisive 
blows, it is reasonable to suggest that guerrilla resistance would work better as a deterrent 
if the strong followed a strategy of concentrating its forces on one “hot spot,” i.e., dealing 
with just one conflict decisively, and only then moving on to the next. Second, if the 
greater power faces other would-be great powers, i.e. those which want to challenge the 
former conventionally, unconventional deterrence by the weak likely would work better, 
because the stronger opponent would not be able to concentrate his resources and efforts 
on the small war with the weaker opponent. In fact, this notion rests on the argument that 
a big-war paradigm (or large, mechanized conventional forces oriented towards greater 
firepower) is not the best means to fight small wars. Hence, if the great power needs to 
adopt a big-war paradigm due to necessity, the weak may maximize the deterrent effect 
of its forces by concentrating on a different type of resistance.  
2. The Interaction-of-Strategies Argument 
The majority of analyses regarding small wars may be subsumed by the over-all 
pattern of counter-insurgency theory. Students of counter-insurgencies, approach the 
problem by asking why strong actors fail to win small wars. In other words, small wars 
are not lost. They are not won. The general conclusion is that great powers do not manage 
to employ appropriate means in dealing with insurgencies. Some of the main reasons why 
overwhelmingly superior forces, both militarily and socio-economically, usually fail to 
convert  their  advantages  in  small  wars  are: malfunctioning military doctrine, failed  
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strategies, poor military and/or political leadership, non-coordination of military and 
political affairs. As mentioned above, the big-war approach is usually pointed out as 
counter-productive in dealing with guerrilla resistance.  
Arreguín-Toft’s (2001) research on the interaction between opponents’ strategies 
in small wars appears to summarize the approach of many studies on counter-
insurgencies when he says, “strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the 
wrong strategy vis-à-vis their weaker adversaries” (p. 121). Arreguín-Toft (2001) argues 
that when strong actors attack with a direct strategy (i.e., using a conventional approach) 
and weak opponents defend themselves indirectly (i.e., by using guerrilla tactics), all 
other things being equal, weak actors should win. On the other hand, if both opponents 
approach the other indirectly, strong states should win (pp. 108-109). However, although 
this explanation, as such, is acceptable for counter-insurgency experts, it is not so clear as 
to what constitutes the indirect approach of a strong actor. Arreguín-Toft identifies the 
indirect approach as barbarism, or as a systematic violation of the laws of war, which 
ranges from the cruelest means (e.g., concentration camps, targeted assassinations of non-
combatants, torture, etc.), to the softest ones (such as replacement of hamlets, 
deforestation, etc.). “Barbarism works as a COIN [i.e., counter-insurgency] strategy 
because by attacking either or both of the essential elements of GWS [i.e., guerrilla 
warfare strategy] – sanctuary and social assistance – it destroys an adversaries capacity to 
fight” (Arreguín-Toft, 2001, p. 19). Merom (2003) also endorses this argument by 
suggesting that “all things being equal, the readiness of strong powers to escalate the 
level of brutality is the key to winning small wars” (p. 48). On the other hand, both 
authors appear to agree that barbarism or brutality can be effective only as a military 
means, but backfires if the desired objective is long-term, political control. Thus, 
Arreguín-Toft (2001) ends his study by drawing this controversial conclusion: 
“Barbarism thus sacrifices victory in peace for victory in war – a poor policy at best” (p. 
123). 
Although it is reasonable to conclude that small wars are lost because a wrong 
strategy/approach was adopted, the complex relationship between the possibility of 
escalating violence and the ability to win a small war suggests that it is difficult to find an 
“indirect approach” that would determine the victory of the strong in small wars, all other 
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things being equal. Notwithstanding the profusion of analysis of small wars, and broadly 
agreed-upon principles of a successful counter-insurgency strategy,23 guerrilla resistance 
remains difficult to deal with, not only in practice, but also in theory. Overall, Arreguín-
Toft (2001) finds that “the strategic interaction thesis suggests that weak adversaries 
employing an indirect defense will be difficult to defeat” (p. 122). Lord (1995) puts it in a 
more mundane manner: “there can be little question that the counterinsurgency is a 
difficult one for soldiers under the best circumstances” (p. 93). Hence, for unconventional 
deterrence (and weak states), the implication appears to be straightforward: if one agrees 
that guerrilla warfare is a form of resistance that even a considerably superior enemy 
would find difficult to fight and defeat, it is logical to suggest that by concentrating on 
guerrilla resistance, the weak would likely increase the deterrent effect of their defensive 
strategies.  
3. Effectiveness of Guerrilla Warfare 
In fact, the argument for the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare is closely 
associated with the above discussed interaction-of-strategies approach. However, the 
counter-insurgency and the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare approaches look at the 
small war phenomenon from different angles. While the latter suggests that the strong 
failed to adopt the right strategies, the former argues that guerrilla warfare is inherently 
effective as a military tactic, and difficult to beat. Such arguments reached a peak in 
1950s and 60s, when it was often assumed, based on historical data, that insurgents were 
likely to be successful (Beckett, 2001, p. viii). As Colonel Nemo stated, speaking at some 
point during that time: “the regular armies have almost never succeeded in gaining the 
ascendancy over guerrilla operations of any importance” (as cited in Laqueur, 1998, p. 
390). Even one of the explanations of the US failure in Vietnam is the argument that the 
war was unwinnable due to “guerrilla tactic, a type of warfare that is virtually impossible 
to defeat” (Boot, 2002, p. 314). In military terms, the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare 
usually is explained by the ability of small and lightly armed units to tie down large 
numbers of their enemy’s troops by avoiding direct confrontation for a considerable 
 
23 For example, Ian F. W. Beckett (2001) identifies six elements of a successful counter-insurgency 
strategy: the recognition of the need for a political rather than a purely military solution; the necessity for 
complete civil-military cooperation; the necessity for a coordinated intelligence effort; the need to split 
active insurgents from their supporters; the use of appropriate military measures; and the need for a long 
term political efforts (p. 22).  
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period of time. Simply put, far more soldiers are necessary for guard duty on a bridge to 
protect it than are needed to blow it up (Laqueur, 1998, p. 275). According to Camille 
Rougeron (1982), a French military theoretician, “the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare is 
uncontestable” (p. 51). 
Because of the ability to resist and counteract superior forces, guerrilla warfare 
has been commonly considered to be the weapon of choice by the weak, or, in other 
words, “classic ‘poor man’s war’” (Beckett, 2001, pix). Merom (2003) displays the 
advantages of guerrilla warfare for the weak, vis-à-vis conventional warfare of pitched 
battles, by comparing the burdens associated with both types of resistance: 
In conventional warfare, armies seek to marshal their forces for decisive 
battles. They therefore rely on a great deal of logistic support, fixed bases, 
and a few wide supply lines. These require a great deal of centralization 
investment of material and human resources in infrastructure, and its 
defensive maintenance. Ultimately, these offer good targets, particularly 
for the militarily superior side. Guerrilla warfare, by relying on small 
independent formations, and on supply and shelter from an existing, 
widely decentralized infrastructure – the general population – can avoid 
much of the burden, as well as a single knockout blow. (p. 34) 
In turn, Merom (2003) states that “guerrilla warfare turns out to be the only form 
of violent resistance that has any chance of surviving repeated encounters with a military 
superior oppressor” (p. 33). 
Another peculiarity of guerrilla conflict is nicely reflected in H. Kissinger’s 
(1969) maxim: “The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it 
does not win.” Putting it simply, the weak, resisting by guerrilla warfare, just need not 
lose, while the aggressor has to win, because, usually, he cannot sustain operations 
indefinitely. Time, thus, is always on the guerrillas’ side. Kissinger’s maxim appears to 
suggest that in military terms, the goal of guerrilla resistance is even less ambitious than 
that in the traditional interpretation of guerrilla warfare: to win, guerrillas do not need to 
exhaust the aggressor’s capacity to fight but only wear down his will. In other words, 
emphasis is put more on the political aspect of guerrilla warfare than on military. 
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For weak states, this approach to small wars seems to suggest several points. First, 
guerrilla warfare is operationally effective: it requires only limited resources, can tie 
down considerably larger numbers of the enemy’s troops, does not offer easy targets for 
the superior opponent, and cannot be defeated with a single, or even several, decisive 
blows. More importantly, guerrilla warfare appears to be the only option that provides 
some chance to resist successfully against the opponent who is superior in every respect. 
In turn, if the weak state considers deterring the strong by denial, adopting a guerrilla 
warfare strategy would likely have a higher deterrent effect than preparing to defend the 
territory conventionally, simply because in the latter case, the victory of the strong 
appears to be preordained. 
4. Asymmetry of Interests and Will 
One of the most elaborated upon dynamics of small wars draws attention to the 
asymmetrical relationship between belligerents. The underdog’s victory is often primarily 
a function of an asymmetry of interests. Andrew Mack (1983) argues that the asymmetry 
of interests and capabilities is often the starting point in the causal mechanism of small 
wars. While underdogs usually fight for survival, great powers often have just peripheral 
interests at stake, and usually enter into a conflict with only limited objectives in mind. It 
is interesting to note that Mack appears to suggest that, the balance of capabilities 
functions differently in small wars than it does in systemic wars. In small wars, the 
overwhelming mismatch in capabilities reinforces the asymmetry of interests, because 
underdogs do not have capabilities for invading great powers, and their survival is usually 
not threatened, at all. In turn, the asymmetry of interests determines the political 
vulnerability of opponents. Inevitably, the greater the mismatch in capabilities, the 
greater the asymmetry of interests, the more politically vulnerable is the great power. In 
small wars, according to Mack, underdogs successfully annihilate the political capability, 
or will, of great powers, rather than their superior military capabilities. 
Some motivational approaches on the other hand, put more emphasis on the 
significance of various intangibles, or will, than on, more or less, “perceptible” interests. 
Although an antagonist’s will is usually derived from its interests, “faith in a dream” 
(using Bell’s (1999) words) sometimes may be quite distinct from clear interests. From 
the motivationalist perspective, the victories of underdogs can be explained in terms of 
45 
“soft” power – i.e., faith, national cohesion, readiness to sacrifice, cost tolerance, etc. The 
assertion is that “will does count” (Bell, 1999, p. 170). Insurgents win wars because the 
balance of will favors them. While the strategic theory of great powers emphasizes war 
power based on the ability to inflict harm, the strategic theory of the guerrilla is based on 
his willingness to suffer (Rosen, 1972, p. 168). As J. Bowyer Bell (1999) notes, “more 
does not assure triumph, for if there is not will at the center then all the things the men in 
nifty uniforms, the money in the bank and the materials, the helicopters and hospitals and 
electronic gear, will not matter” (p. 170).  
R. Thompson and M. Howard emphasize, in particular, the significance of the 
social strength of underdogs in small wars (as cited in Merom, 2003, p. 10). What is of 
high importance is that great powers, imposing themselves on other nations, appear to 
strengthen the cohesion of underdogs. As Bell (1999) suggests, “Enemies are necessary 
to the faith” (p. 172). In fact, that explains why it has been so difficult for invading 
powers to win the “hearts and minds” of the indigenous people. As well, this seems to be 
connected with the view that guerrilla wars tend to be most effective when they make 
appeals to national resistance or the desire for independence (Liddell Hart, 1968, p. 349). 
Laqueur (1977) also finds that for guerrilla movements, “it has been infinitely easier to 
succeed against foreigners, however strong, than against native incumbents, however 
ineffective” (p. 6).  
In fact, the argument that the dynamics of small wars are a function of an 
asymmetry of interests and will is connected with the assertion that the balance of 
motivations matters for deterrence success. For weak states, this approach would suggest 
emphasizing the interests at stake, and the will to protect these interests in deterrence 
strategies, while pointing out the political vulnerability of the great powers to long, 
protracted, and unwinnable guerrilla wars.  
5. Democracies and Small Wars 
Another argument about the dynamics of small wars refers to the political system 
of a warring great power. As Stephen P. Rosen argues, the social structure of the political 
unit can affect its ability to generate military power (as cited in Lwin, 1997, p. 17). 
Concerning small wars, the common argument is that democracies are cost-sensitive and 
fight small wars rather badly. In contrast, authoritarian political systems are less 
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susceptible to internal and external opposition (Mack, 1983, p. 192) and, therefore, tend 
to perform better in small wars. Merom takes this argument of the importance of the 
political system further, concluding that the domestic structure of the warring strong 
power is the primary determinant of the outcome of small wars. In other words, 
democracies tend to lose small wars at home (Merom, 2003, p. 26). 
Merom (2003) constructs a theoretical model, explaining the process by which 
democratic states lose small wars, in spite of their military superiority. Putting it simply, 
as an insurgency becomes protracted (i.e., because of guerrilla warfare), casualties of war 
increasingly become unacceptable for the educated middle class, which doubts the 
expedience of war. This, in turn, starts to influence the politico-military decisions on the 
battlefield – i.e., the incumbent starts using less discriminate and higher violence in order 
to produce tangible and quicker results. Growing brutality, on the other hand, raises 
doubts about the morality of war, which, in turn, starts being depicted as threatening the 
very foundations of democracy, and the identity of the warring state, itself. Thus, the 
center of gravity often shifts from the battlefield to domestic discussions. In sum, 
democracies are seldom able to find the balance between expedience and morality in 
small wars. 
For weak states, this approach suggests that guerrilla warfare, as a defensive 
strategy, would be more successful against democracies. Of course, this does not translate 
automatically to more reliable unconventional deterrence, unless the aggressor’s leaders 
believe that internal opposition can prevent them from achieving their war aims further 
down the road. Thus, the underdog’s public diplomacy, stimulating internal discussions 
in the strong state regarding the possibility of attack, may increase the deterrent effect of 
the unconventional deterrence strategy.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES: THE VIETNAM AND AFGHANISTAN WARS 
Although the Vietnam War of 1964-73, and the Afghanistan War of 1979-89, are 
not directly related to unconventional deterrence, both wars are classic examples of 
conflicts in which guerrilla warfare played an essential role. Thus, the focus of the 
discussion of these case studies is on the underdogs’ strategies that allowed them to 
protract the conflicts, make the opponents’ overwhelming military superiority irrelevant, 
and deny the strong their political objectives. Both cases suggest that: first, adopting a 
guerrilla warfare strategy may compensate for an overwhelming military inferiority; and 
second, that having large enough short-term and/or long-term military capabilities is not 
the only way to protract a war and prevent an opponent from a fait accompli (which has 
been identified as a requirement for successful deterrence). In turn, both cases support the 
argument that the weaker opponent could increase the deterrent effects of their inferior 
military capabilities, vis-à-vis great powers, by adopting guerrilla warfare strategy. 
A. THE VIETNAM WAR OF 1964-73 
After twenty-five years of their being involved in Vietnam (i.e., from their first 
giving of material support to the French in 1950, to the evacuation of the US embassy in 
Hanoi in 1975), the US withdrew without realizing its political aims, notwithstanding its 
commitment of vast expeditionary forces, and overall strategic superiority. Saigon fell to 
the North Vietnamese communists (i.e., the Vietminh). With the cost of about 50,000 
American military killed in action, 150,000 seriously wounded, and the price tag of at 
least $110 billion (Handel, 1981, p. 274; Beckett, 2001, p. 192), it has been said that all 
the US achieved “was to buy their South Vietnamese allies a few more years of political 
independence” (Merom, 2003, p. 232). By contrast, the underdog – i.e., the “coalition” of 
the North Vietnamese government and the Vietcong (the South Vietnamese guerrillas) – 
was able to force the opponent to terminate its military presence and curtail its material 
support for the South Vietnamese government and army, and finally reunify the country 
under Hanoi’s control.  
The US got involved in Vietnam incrementally, from 729 Americans assigned to 
Military Assistance and Advisory Group in 1954, to 541,000 military personnel in 1969. 
But confident that after one more escalation would cause the enemy to reach the 
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“breaking point,” US forces believed they would be able to “stabilize” South Vietnam, 
and then exit (Arreguín-Toft, 2001, p. 118). According to Bell (1999), there was no 
reason why an American commitment would not prove effective in Vietnam, a small 
country that was under threat from an insurgency: “Thus, even if America faced a long 
war in Vietnam, both the military and strategic tools existed where the French had failed. 
America had the appropriate resources – an endless supply of tangible assets – to win, to 
turn Saigon around, to fashion an army that would in alliance pursue a war of attrition to 
inevitable victory” (p. 288). As Summers (1995) finds, in the Vietnam War, the US 
military succeeded in everything they set out to do – “on the battlefield itself, the Army 
was unbeatable” (p. 1). Yet, in the end, the war was lost. “The communist insurgency 
really did win the war. Not by defeating U.S. forces on the battlefield – but that was 
never its goal” (Boot, 2002, p. 316). According to Laqueur (1998), “the Communist high 
command was all along aware that military victory against Americans was ruled out; the 
strategic aim was therefore to make the war so costly for the United States that it would 
tire and withdraw” (p. 276). 
After the French retreated from Indochina, and the Geneva accords partitioned 
Vietnam into two countries, with Ho Chi Minh in control of North Vietnam and vague 
allusions to common elections in 1956, the Vietminh apparently focused on consolidating 
their rule over the North Vietnam for the next several years. However, guerrilla war in 
the South never ceased, entirely, and began increasing, gradually, from 1957 (Laqueur, 
1998, p. 270). Hanoi had a foothold in the South from the very beginning of the 
insurgency – about 6,000 Vietminh fighters, who remained in the South after the partition 
(Laqueur, 1998, p. 274). They were engaging in propaganda campaigns early on, and 
used mainly discriminate terror tactics, such as assassinations of teachers and 
administrators, and public “trials” and executions of village officials (Asprey, 1994, p. 
618). Joes (1996) reports, that between 1954 and 1958, they murdered about 20 percent 
of South Vietnam’s village chiefs and schoolteachers (p. 102). After the Vietminh 
officially decided to resume their armed struggle in the South to reunify the country in 
1959, the South Vietnamese communists, who had been evacuated to the North after the 
Geneva accords, began infiltrating South Vietnam, to organize an infrastructure for 
guerrilla war (Boot, 2002, p. 287). According to Bell (1999), by 1959, Hanoi had taken 
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over the direction of the Vietcong in the South (p. 284). The small-scale infiltration of 
regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops followed, and guerrilla attacks intensified. 
After the naval incident in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, the US retaliated with limited air 
strikes against North Vietnam, which turned into a prolonged bombing campaign. In 
March 1965, the first ground combat troops landed, providing security for an American 
airbase. By that time, the number of regular North Vietnamese soldiers who had been 
dispatched to the South was estimated at 38,000, and the Vietcong numbered at least 
220,000 (Boot, 2002, p. 294). The US military presence also grew at a similar pace – to 
389,000 in 1966 (Bell, 1999, p296).  
It is interesting to note, as Laqueur (1998) does, that the North Vietnamese, in 
contrast to other guerrilla campaigns, were in a position early on in their war to set up a 
regular army that was relatively well-equipped and combat-experienced (p. 262). 
However, they did not launch an outright invasion of the South. Having in mind the US 
commitment to South Vietnam, it seems that the Vietminh realized, from the very 
beginning, that fighting a conventional war of pitched battles against a superior enemy 
would inevitably result in their defeat. Instead, the NVA regulars and Vietcong guerrillas 
used, essentially, classic guerrilla “hit-and-run” tactics (e.g., ambushes, laying mines, and 
raids on airfields, military bases, and police outposts). Nor did they agree to fight on the 
enemy’s terms, i.e., in large-scale engagements, with the exception of several 
conventional offensives, which proved to be militarily disastrous for the NVA and 
Vietcong (discussed below in the text). Boot (2002) states that “the American forces 
seldom managed to pin down enough of the Vietcong to bring their overwhelming 
firepower to bear” (p. 298). By dispersing and disappearing in jungles, the NVA and 
Vietcong guerrillas made large-unit, search-and-destroy missions largely ineffective. 
When guerrillas chose to fight, they used some irregular tactics (e.g., extensive tunnel 
systems [Bell, 1999, pp. 299-308]), or closed so tightly with the enemy’s formations that 
close air and artillery support, was risky because of eventual “friendly” casualties. Yet, 
the Vietcong and NVA retained initiative and forced the US and South Vietnamese 
troops to fight on the guerrillas’ terms. As one official study reported, by 1967, 88 
percent of all engagements were initiated by the NVA and Vietcong (Beckett, 2001, p. 
90). 
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Likewise, “air strikes against the Vietcong were not decisive either, because the 
enemy was usually not visible” (Laqueur, 1998, p. 275). Bell (1999) estimates each killed 
enemy “cost” 75 bombs and 150 artillery shells for the US (p. 297). According to some 
accounts, the Vietcong fighters even managed to make aerial bombardments 
counterproductive by directing them onto civilian targets. By deliberately demonstrating 
their presence in some villages, they provoked air strikes or artillery shelling. However, 
by the time the bombing started, they had slipped away, thus, leaving only non-
combatants to suffer the effects of the bombing.  
Relentless air attacks on the supply lines of the Ho Chi Minh Trail did not have 
decisive effects either: bombing did not stop the flow of supplies and infiltration of 
fighters. The US frustration with the Ho Chi Minh Trail exemplifies how focusing on the 
warfare that does not depend on vast logistic lines and uninterrupted flows of supplies, 
can significantly diminish the utility of greater firepower in attacks on supply lines. 
Beckett (2001) suggests that “NVA and Vietcong units required few supplies since they 
were not engaged in continuous combat operations” (p. 190). Boot (2002) also states that 
vast amounts of munitions expended to close the supply lines were futile because 
Vietcong did not need much aid from the North. In 1965, the Vietcong (numbering 
220,000 by 1965, according to Boot) needed only 12 tons of supplies a day, which could 
be carried in 15 pickup trucks (p. 295). That is not to suggest, though, that guerrilla 
warfare does not need logistic supplies, at all. However, the low scale of logistic supplies 
needed for guerrilla warfare may considerably decrease the possibility that the strong 
could make a quick and decisive impact on the outcome of war by attacking supply lines. 
Although low-intensity guerrilla warfare was the pivotal aspect of the NVA and 
Vietcong strategy, it was not the only one. The intensity of war fluctuated. As prescribed 
by the “orthodox” guerrilla warfare doctrine, the NVA and Vietcong, on occasion, 
gathered their troops for smaller or larger scale “phase III”,24 or conventional, attacks. 
However, the common outcome of these pitched battles – the “American battlefield 
triumph” (using Bell’s words (1999, p. 318)) – rather supports the argument that defeat is 
 
24 Mao identifies three phases of insurgency, or “people’s war”: Phase I - building extensive political 
support and underground networks; Phase II – launching protracted guerrilla struggle; Phase III – 
developing of regular units, which, in conjunction with popular uprising, will finally overrun an enemy’s 
forces. See on Mao revolutionary experience, for example, Beckett (2001, pp. 70-86).  
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the invariable result when the weak fight on the superior opponent’s terms. Arreguín-Toft 
(2001) states that in a sequence of pitched battles between NVA regular units and those 
of the US and South Vietnamese that lasted throughout the war, “the US forces proved 
overwhelmingly successful at destroying North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong 
(VC) main-force units” (p. 115). According to Beckett (2001), Giap repeated his errors 
by launching premature conventional offensives, which exposed the Vietminh to the full 
weight of the opponents’ firepower (p. 90). The Tet Offensive of 1968, a massive NVA 
and Vietcong attack on the major towns and cities in the South done simultaneously, 
proved to be a major military defeat of the Vietminh. “Hanoi had made a major strategic 
error in opting for a relatively conventional attack by light-infantry on the core areas of 
ARVN and American strength” (Bell, 1999, p. 313). Although, the attackers achieved 
some initial successes, quickly the initiative passed to Saigon and the US, and in a few 
weeks, the NVA and Vietcong were pushed back. The Communists lost about 50,000 
fighters as killed in action. The Vietcong was virtually destroyed as a fighting force 
(Boot, 2002, p. 308), never to be as effectively recreated (Bell, 1999, p. 315). Ironically, 
the Tet Offensive had a profound impact on the American public, who had believed that 
the war was being won by the US. The major Vietcong and NVA defeat, and the US 
military victory, turned out to be the turning point in the war: the US policy shifted to the 
‘peace with honor’ and ‘Vietnamisation’ policy, which, in fact, was a gradual de-
escalation and withdrawal. Although Tet turned out to be a victory for Hanoi, after all, 
and Hanoi very quickly recognized and exploited it, Giap and Ho Chi Minh had not 
foreseen such a favorable return from the Tet Offensive (Bell, 199, 315). 
The majority of the subsequent, main-unit engagements between the NVA and the 
US forces also demonstrated the same pattern – i.e., superior firepower prevailed over the 
underdog in the battlefield. In the second round of the Tet Offensive in May 1968 and in 
the siege of Khe Shan, US conventional power triumphed (Bell, 1999, p. 318). The 
Eastern Offensive of 1972 demonstrated the crucial effects of the US air power on the 
conventional battlefield: Giap’s offensive was destroyed, mainly by air power (Joes, 
1996,  p. 103;  Beckett,  2001,  p. 192). True, in 1975, South Vietnam fell after the North 
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Vietnamese all-out conventional offensive. However, with the US ground troops and air 
support withdrawn, and material support critically curtailed, the North communists were 
no longer an underdog.  
Mack (1983) draws several conclusions from the Vietnam War, which, by any 
“conventional” logic, the United States should have won. First, superiority in military 
force (i.e., conventionally defined) does not guarantee victory, and may even be 
counterproductive. Second, the theater of war may extend, under certain circumstances, 
beyond the battlefield, to encompass the social and political institutions of the invading 
power. Finally, the Vietnam War emphasized the enormous importance that guerrilla 
strategists place on “protracted warfare” (pp. 177-178). In fact, all of these inferences 
appear to be interdependent. To protract a war against a superior enemy is possible only 
by making his military superiority irrelevant, to some degree. In turn, only if an enemy is 
precluded from achieving a quick and decisive victory, can a weaker side count upon 
gradually eroding the political capability of a warring power to persist in war. Concerning 
the Vietnam War, the North’s guerrilla warfare strategy made it possible for the Vietminh 
to counteract the US’s superiorities, protract the war, and, in turn, wear down the US 
political will, rather than its military capabilities. The North Vietnamese Army and the 
Vietcong concentrated primarily on conducting a low-intensity, guerrilla war, and, just on 
occasion, gathered their troops for smaller or larger scale conventional attacks, which 
proved to be not the best military moves of Hanoi. Although we have to acknowledge 
that many other factors played in the Vietnam War (such as the extremely high 
motivation of the Vietminh communists to suffer, the flawed US counterinsurgency 
doctrine (presumably), self-limitation of the US not to invade North Vietnam, Soviet and 
Chinese material support to the North, vulnerability of the South to infiltration from Laos 
and Cambodia, etc.), these do not disprove the effectiveness of low-intensity guerrilla 
warfare as a weapon of the weak vis-à-vis conventional warfare of pitched battles. 
B. THE AFGHANISTAN WAR OF 1979-89 
The Afghanistan war – often referred to as “Russia’s Vietnam” – provides a 
classic textbook study “of how a major power can fail to win a war against guerrillas” 
(Joes, 1996, p. 119). After ten years of fighting in Afghanistan (1979-89), the Soviets did 
not achieve their objectives: shore up the client regime, consolidate communist influence, 
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and institutionalize the presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. “Despite a favorable 
strategic position and overwhelming advantages in material and technology, the Soviet 
Armed Forces achieved no better than a military stalemate against poorly equipped, 
disunited, but fiercely resistant mujahedin” (McMichael, 2002, p. 270). The mujahedin 
(i.e., “holy warriors”) resistance succeeded in making the continued occupation of the 
country too costly and imposing military stalemate (Joes, 1996, p. 121). Notwithstanding 
the tragicomic disparity in wealth and military power (Joes, 1996, p. 120), the Soviet 
Union did not manage to eliminate guerrilla resistance, and “humiliating withdrawal 
provided the only way out in 1988” (McMichael, 2002, p. 270). In February 1989, the 
last Soviet troops were withdrawn. In April 1992, Kabul felt to the mujahedin. Ironically, 
with the cost about 14,000 killed soldiers, and 70,000 wounded in action (Shaw and 
Spencer, 2003, p. 177), and a price tag of about $3 billion annually (Beckett, 2001, p. 
212), the most significant “achievement” of the Soviet Union appeared to be “the loss of 
the Soviet military’s image of invincibility” (Odom, 1998, p. 247). Some scholars even 
speculate that the lost war in Afghanistan significantly influenced the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union.  
The pattern for the Afghani guerrilla resistance was established, even before the 
arrival of the Soviets to Afghanistan. Armed revolt throughout the countryside and 
uprisings in cities had been increasing incrementally as a response to anti-Islam and anti-
tribal reforms, implemented by the communist regime, which came to power through a 
military coup in April 1978 (although it is not clear whether Moscow orchestrated this 
coup). By the time the Soviets invaded the country, virtually no part of Afghanistan, 
except the major cities, was securely controlled by the government (Collins, 1986). 
However, the Soviets’ presence inflamed the resistance even more, instead of 
intimidating insurgents. The invasion provided the common enemy for the fragmented 
resistance. Shortly after their arrival in the country, the Soviets came under fire from hit-
and-run attacks. Soon, impelled by the appeal of the jihad (or “holy war against 




It is interesting to note that guerrilla warfare against the Soviets, in contrast to the 
Vietnam War, does not seem to be a strategic decision based on a necessity of fighting 
against a militarily superior enemy. The Soviets faced very fragmented guerrilla forces, 
composed of numerous factions divided along political, ethnic, tribal, clan and family 
lines. Any centralized strategic decision was impossible. Collins (1986) suggests that “the 
initial mujahedin resistance was based on traditional Afghan warfare, with few signs of 
any methodological approach to the problems of fighting against a modern army.” Even 
the coordination of resistance would have been very difficult, especially in the beginning: 
“what happened in one province or even part of a province did not often affect events 
elsewhere” (Asprey, 1994, p. 1206). The mujahedin comprised at least seven main 
resistance groups that came together more formally as the “Islamic Unity of Afghan 
Mujahedin” only in 1985 (Beckett, 2001, p. 209). This lack, or even absence, of strategic 
coordination is usually identified as the main weakness of the mujahedin. The common 
opinion is that, if the mujahedin had coordinated their actions, they would have been 
much more militarily effective against the Soviet armed forces. On the other hand, Poole 
(2004) suggests that the minimum strategic guidance, presumably provided by the 
Pakistani intelligence service (ISI), was enough for the mujahedin, and the tactical 
successes was due to its lack of organization: “a Soviet agent would have found nothing 
to infiltrate, no irreplaceable head to cut off” (p. 89). 
Although it is not open to speculation how more elaborate strategic coordination 
may have affected the military performance of the mujahedin, the fragmented social 
structure, as Shaw and Spencer (2003) suggest, made the Afghan mujahedin a natural 
guerrilla fighter on the tactical level: “their social and tribal organization led them to 
naturally form and operate in small groups” (p. 178). The main tactics of mujahedin were 
hit-and-run operations, with small units of 20 to 50 men, equipped only with light arms 
and a limited quantity of heavy weapons (Cassidy, 2003, p. 36). “With little firepower, 
they relied on surprise during both offense and defense” Poole, 2004, p. 98). Close 
ambushes, long-range sniping, and assault on outposts remained the main types of 
operations throughout the war. Assassinations, bombings, and sabotage actions were 
employed in cities, especially in Kabul (Asprey, 1994, p. 1208). Occasionally the 
mujahedin even managed to mount high profile raids in Kabul, such as attacks on the 
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Soviet embassy and KHAD (secret police) headquarters. The supply operations followed 
the same pattern – operating in small units. According to Hamizrachi (2003), “even when 
conducting large-scale weapons smuggling operations from across the Pakistani border 
they dissected each caravan into small groups of a few donkeys here and a small truck 
here” (as cited in Shaw and Spencer, 2003, p. 178). Regarding the weaponry and 
equipment, the mujahedin mainly maintained a low-tech, but innovative profile. For 
example, they reused Soviet mines as improvised explosive devises, or adjusted RPGs 
(rocket-propelled grenade) to be able to use them as anti-aircraft weapons. However, the 
successful employment of Stingers (i.e., shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missiles), which 
were likely provided by the US in 1986, clearly exemplifies that guerrilla warfare is not 
inconsistent with advanced systems. In general, the guerrillas retained the initiative 
throughout the war. They refused to fight on the enemy’s terms – during the Soviets’ 
large-sweep operations, insurgent forces usually avoided contact and withdrew 
(McMichael, 2002, p. 264). As Cassidy (2003) suggests, “the Mujahedin chose the places 
and time to attack their enemy… The guerrillas would only fight under favorable 
conditions, and, when the conditions become unfavorable, like ghosts, the insurgents 
would disappear in surrounding terrain” (p. 35). 
For the present discussion, two aspects of the Soviet-Afghan war are of high 
importance: 
First, the mujahedin successfully resisted the invader, and forced him to withdraw 
his forces, entirely, by using guerrilla warfare (with the possible exception of very 
sporadic bigger-unit encounters, and mobile defense using cave and tunnel systems). 
They neither operated in conjunction with conventional forces, nor tried to develop 
themselves gradually into a regular army to crush the invader’s military forces in pitched 
battles (Joes, 1996, p. 125). In other words, the mujahedin guerrillas did not follow the 
traditional (and most accepted in practice) doctrine that considers guerrilla warfare only 
as a transitional phase in war – i.e., that finally, the enemy needs to be defeated in an all-
out conventional offensive. In contrast to traditional guerrilla doctrine, hit-and-run tactics 
were an essential way of war of the mujahedin throughout the war. The Soviets left 
Afghanistan  not  because  they  needed  their  armed  forces  elsewhere,  or  because  the  
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guerrillas became strong enough to threaten the Soviets on the battlefield. They left 
because they were unable to defeat guerrilla resistance and realize their political 
objectives. In turn, the price of war became too high, and their political capability to 
continue the war was exhausted.  
Second, the Afghanistan war exemplifies the difference between occupying a 
country and holding it: “while it was relatively easy to seize Afghanistan, it was quite 
another matter to keep it” (Shaw and Spencer, 2003, p. 177). According to H. J. Poole 
(2004), over the centuries, Afghans have learned how to repel powerful invaders, not by 
conventional defense, but by discouraging occupation (p. 88). The Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan in December 1979 and swiftly seized Kabul, executed Amin, the head of 
Afghanistan, and installed a puppet regime. Within days, the Soviet military suppressed 
the resistance of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Army, controlled key 
population centers, Afghan army and air bases, and the highway network, and dominated 
the government. By the end of January 1980, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan numbered 
50,000. According to S. McMichael (2002), “by any measure, the Soviet invasion and 
initial occupation of the country must be considered a resounding success” (p. 262). 
However, the stabilization of Afghanistan and the elimination of insurgency proved 
beyond the will and means of the Soviet Union to achieve (McMichael, 2002, p. 262). 
The easy conventional victory quickly evolved into a protracted guerrilla war. The 
Soviets invaded with the limited military objectives in mind – provide stability by 
establishing garrisons in key locations, build up the DRA Army into effective force, and, 
avoiding fighting themselves, direct and support (with air, artillery, intelligence, and 
logistic) the DRA Army’s operations against insurgents throughout the countryside. 
However, they overestimated the feasibility of transforming the DRA Army into an 
effective fighting force (McMichael, 2002, p. 263). On the other hand, the troops of the 
DRA armed forces were apparently rapidly demoralized, when they found themselves 
fighting their kinsmen under the command of the invader and its puppet regime (Blank, 
1988, p. 62). Untrustworthiness and desertions became a persistent problem (Collins, 
1986). Beginning in March 1980, the Soviet troops (Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces 
in Afghanistan, LCSFA) were compelled to move out of their bases to respond to 
mujahedin incursions. These initial efforts evolved gradually into continuous anti-
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guerrilla operations. In turn, the Soviet Union quickly realized that additional troops were 
required and the LCSFA grew in size to about 110,000-120,000 by the mid-1982, a level 
that was maintained throughout the rest of the war (McMichael, 2002, p. 264). In 
addition, the LCSFA were supported by 30,000 troops from the USSR territory (Beckett, 
2001, 211). However, even these numbers were not enough to stabilize the country and 
repress the mujahedin resistance, which numbered, according to various sources, about 
90,000 (Asprey, 1994, p. 1206), of whom about 20,000 were active at any one time 
(Collins, 1986). One of the main criticisms of the Soviets’ strategy was their reluctance to 
commit much larger troop strengths to Afghanistan. Seventy-five to ninety percent of 
Afghan territory was not under the Soviets’ control throughout the war (Beckett, 2001, p. 
211). After offensive sweeps, the mujahedin were able to quickly reestablish their control 
of objective areas by methodically attacking and driving out any outposts that had been 
left behind (McMichael, 2002, p. 265). McMichael (2002) suggests that it would have 
required perhaps about 500,000 troops to stabilize the countryside, and to achieve victory 
(p. 266). Joes (1996) almost redoubles the number: “to achieve the traditional ten-to-one 
ratio of troops to guerrillas, the Soviets would have to put ay least 900,000 soldiers into 
Afghanistan, eight times the size of their actual commitment, and even then there would 
be no assurance of a speedy solution” (p. 124). Apparently, instead of committing more 
troops, the Soviets tried to kill, paraphrasing Mao, the “fish” (i.e., guerrillas) by draining 
the “sea” (i.e., people). In other words, if one distinguishes between two broad 
approaches to insurgencies – a short-term approach of “great power and effective 
brutality” or a long-term approach of “patience and cunning” (Bell, 1999, p. 220) – the 
Soviets apparently concentrated on the former. A strategy of “scorched earth” and 
“migratory genocide” (e.g., burning crops, slaughtering livestock, destroying agricultural 
infrastructure, contaminating water, bombing town and villages, dropping anti-personnel 
mines, and even using poison gasses) was employed on systematic basis in order to 
deprive the guerrillas of their popular support (food, information, and shelter) by driving 
off the inhabitants (Asprey, 1994, p. 1207). Although an estimated 4 million refugees had 
already been generated by 1982 (Beckett, 2001, p. 211), and the agricultural production 
decreased by 25 percent in 1985 compared with prewar levels (Collins, 1986), it does not 
appear that such policy had a significant effect on the mujahedin. Most probably, the 
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guerrillas compensated for the deprivation of popular support by increasing numbers of 
recruits from the alienated population and refugees, and smuggling more supplies from 
outside, especially via the Pakistani-Afghan border. In brief, the swift, massive, and 
elegant invasion of the Soviets contrasts sharply with the difficulties that the LCSFA 
experienced trying to stabilize the country. With the price (committing no more than 
approximately 120,000 troops) and time that Soviets were prepared to dedicate for 
victory, they were unable to defeat the guerrilla resistance. Neither did the high level of 
brutality help, which was employed systematically. Marshal V. Kulikov, the commander-
in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, admitted early on in the war that while it was possible 
to win a victory in Afghanistan in military terms, it was another thing to rule it (as cited 
in Blank, 1988, p. 72). 
In sum, the Soviet-Afghan war demonstrates the potential of guerrilla warfare as a 
weapon against a militarily superior enemy. The mujahedin were able to protract the war, 
thus, making the cost too big for the Soviet Union to persist. The Soviets retreated 
without realizing their political aims. As well, this war clearly exemplifies the difference 
between invading and occupying a country, and holding and ruling it. Swift and massive 
invasion did not assure successful stabilization of the country afterwards. The mujahedin 





In this study, unconventional deterrence is defined as persuading the opponent not 
to attack through using threats of unconventional warfare, such as terrorism and guerrilla 
resistance. Terrorism is treated primarily as a punishment strategy, where the deterrer 
threatens to punish the aggressor’s population by making retaliatory terrorist strikes, 
while guerrilla warfare is defined as a denial strategy. By adopting a guerrilla warfare 
strategy, the deterrer threatens to protract a war, thereby, making it more costly for the 
aggressor, and to deny, eventually, the aggressor from achieving their political objectives.  
Unconventional deterrence, in general, and the possibility of a weaker opponent 
deterring a stronger one, in particular, are largely unexplored areas in deterrence theory. 
In fact, because the underlying hypothesis of commonly-held deterrence theory is based 
on the balance of military capabilities between the deterrer and the aggressor (i.e., 
weighing the military strengths of one against the other), the weak are virtually precluded 
from the possibility of deterring a considerably stronger opponent. On the other hand, 
deterrence theory also argues that deterrence should obtain, all other things being equal, 
if the aggressor is precluded from achieving a short and decisive victory. Aggressors do 
not like long wars, because they are costly, and unpredictable. Unfortunately, deterrence 
theory does not look beyond the common argumentation, that having military capabilities 
to match the opponent’s military muscle is the only way to threaten him with either a 
prolonged war, or defeat on the battlefield. However, this thesis contends that, by 
adopting a certain military strategy, an underdog may protract a war, notwithstanding 
being overwhelmingly mismatched, militarily. Large, strategic capabilities that can 
withstand a long war, and/or short-term military forces, to repulse an attack, from the 
very beginning, and defeat the aggressor, militarily, are not the only possibilities in 
protracting a war, and/or denying the aggressor from achieving his objectives. The US-
Vietnamese and the Soviet-Afghan wars suggest that an inferior opponent can protract a 
war by adopting a low-intensity guerrilla warfare strategy, which, in both cases, 
counteracted the superior military capabilities of the opponents (i.e., the US in the first, 
and the Soviets in the second). In turn, the Vietnamese communists and the Afghan 
mujahedin succeeded in denying the superpowers from achieving their political 
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objectives. Particularly, the Afghanistan War exemplifies that there is a considerable 
difference between defending a country conventionally and discouraging an occupation. 
Therefore, the present study contends that the balance of military capabilities is not an 
overriding determinant in deterrence. Deterrence theory also needs to consider the 
opponents’ strategies (i.e., weighing military strategies). If an inferior opponent adopts a 
strategy that makes the aggressor’s military superiority irrelevant, to a certain degree, 
deterrence may hold, notwithstanding an overwhelming imbalance in military 
capabilities. Hence, strategy is also a determinant in deterrence situations. In 
unconventional deterrence, especially, the deterrer’s strategy is more important than the 
balance of military capabilities between the opponents.  
Small war theories also suggest that underdogs’ victories in war are not 
accidental. Although it is impossible, for obvious reasons, to establish an unambiguous 
small war dynamics, and identify conditions under which an underdog’s victory would be 
guaranteed in a small war, several insights from these theories support the argument of 
this thesis. That is, that an underdog may increase the deterrent effect of its military 
capabilities by concentrating its defensive efforts on unconventional warfare. First, great 
powers adopt big-war paradigms through sheer necessity (which, in fact, is not the best 
approach to dealing with guerrilla resistance), because they need to be prepared to 
counter other “would-be” great powers. Second, counterinsurgency is a difficult task, 
even under the best of circumstances. Thus, there is no easy and quick answer to 
countering guerrilla resistance – a weak actor, employing guerrilla resistance, is difficult 
to defeat. Third, the balance of interests and motivations, usually, favors the weak in 
small wars. Therefore, the stronger opponent is politically vulnerable in protracted wars. 
Finally, guerrilla warfare may be an optimal weapon of the weak. Compared with 
conventional defenses, hit-and-run tactics, the avoidance of pitched battles, operating 
through a decentralized command, the ability to blend with civilian populations, and a 
much lower reliance on uninterrupted logistic support, all allow the underdog to 
counteract a great deal of the superior firepower of the enemy, and to tie down large 
numbers of the enemy’s troops. As well, in a small war, the underdog does not need to 
defeat  the  opponent,  militarily. All he must do is protract war by not losing, thus  
61 
gradually wearing down the opponent’s political will in persisting. Hence, these insights 
suggest that, by adopting guerrilla warfare strategies, underdogs would likely increase the 
deterrent effect of their military forces, vis-à-vis the superior enemy. 
However, this study also concludes that unconventional deterrence, as a strategy, 
is far more problematic and unreliable, compared with nuclear and conventional 
deterrence. Unconventional capabilities are neither very impressive, nor clear in their 
levels of destructiveness. Because of their relatively limited destructiveness, there will 
always be a high probability that the aggressor will take a risk, or choose to suffer the 
price. Hence, its low destructiveness is an inherent weakness of unconventional 
deterrence. To deter the aggressor, via threats of inflicting a precise loss, is far more 
difficult than through threats of inflicting devastating damage. The low levels of 
destructiveness of unconventional deterrence suggests that, first, unconventional 
deterrence will work only when the opponent is cost-sensitive, and second, that 
unconventional deterrence strategies should be tailored, very precisely, to the 
vulnerabilities and fears of a specific opponent, its society, and its leadership, in order to 
produce the deterrent effect.  
The present study suggests that the relatively limited destructiveness of 
unconventional threats can be compensated for, to a certain extent, if an unconventional 
deterrence strategy can reinforce the opponent’s internalized deterrence. An aggressor 
that has previously manifested difficulties in dealing with unconventional warfare, will 
more likely be deterred through the use unconventional threats, than an aggressor that has 
not so manifested. One of the circumstances most favorable to the use of unconventional 
deterrence occurs when the opponent’s previous unfortunate experience in small wars has 
resulted in it having some internalized fears. The best example of such internalized fears 
is the US’s aversion to small wars as a result of their experience in Vietnam. The 
existence of the long-term self-deterrent effect, induced by the US’s lost war in Vietnam, 
increases considerably the likelihood that the threats of resistance through guerrilla 
warfare will produce the desired deterrent effect. The presence of such a threat may have 
made it more difficult for the U.S. to invade Iraq in 2003. On the other hand, the 
difficulties in defeating the ongoing insurgency, and stabilizing Iraq, may increase, even 
more, the US’s sensitivity to low-intensity, guerrilla wars. Concerning punishment 
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strategies by retaliatory terrorist attacks, unconventional deterrence appears to work 
better if the aggressor had a painful experience in dealing with terrorism on a previous 
occasion. Thus, if internalized deterrence exists in an opponent’s strategic culture, 
unconventional deterrence strategies would be much more feasible and credible. 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned unreliability of unconventional deterrence, 
this study concludes that, concentrating defense efforts on guerrilla resistance can 
increase the deterrent effects of the underdog’s military capabilities, vis-à-vis a superior 
enemy. If the aggressor is able, literally, to overrun the deterrer’s military forces on the 
battlefield, conventional deterrence is not feasible. On the other hand, by resisting 
unconventionally, the weak state has, at least, a possibility to succeed in protracting a 
conflict, and denying the great power from acquiring his political objectives. When the 
imbalance in capabilities is overwhelming, deterrence is most likely to succeed when the 
weak state adopts a strategy that does not play to the strengths of the enemy. While the 
Soviets-Afghan war suggests that the aggressor can be repulsed entirely through guerrilla 
warfare, the conventional phases of the Vietnam War suggest that military defeat is an 
inevitable outcome when the weak state tries to fight the strong in a conventional war of 
pitched battles. Overall, the only type of conflicts in which great powers have lost against 
underdogs has been guerrilla wars. 
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